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world's constitutional democracies have created. After providing some examples and illustrations
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has proven to be so consequential in so many countries - this Article discusses how government
in opposition rules have much to offer constitutional designers around the world. In fragile
democracies and stable democracies alike, government in opposition rules can better constrain
power and stabilize the core elements of constitutional democracy, better prepare all parties to
govern effectively, more fairly involve all interests in the process of governing -and can do all of
this at minimal cost. To illustrate this point, this Article closes with a discussion of how
government in opposition rules might work in the United States, and how they might remedy
some of the current political and constitutional problems that we face.
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INTRODUCTION
We all remember Wednesday morning, November 5, 2008, the morning
after the 2oo8 American presidential election between Republican Presidential
nominee John McCain and Democratic Presidential nominee Barack Obama.
President-elect Obama won a clear majority of the national popular vote, a
landslide in the electoral vote, and his Democratic Party captured more seats in
the House of Representatives and the Senate. But imagine if the next day,
despite such a major Democratic victory, because of a constitutional or other
legal obligation, Obama was required to name a Republican such as Senator
Orrin Hatch as his Attorney General -putting Hatch in control of the future of
judicial appointments and wiretapping programs - and Obama was required to
name his former rival McCain as his new Secretary of Defense, in charge of
Obama's military policy in Afghanistan and Iraq.
This idea about government -of granting losing political parties the right
not just to dissent from and obstruct the efforts of the winning political party,
but also to exercise the power to govern as well -is an approach to government
I call "government in opposition." In the past several decades, rules granting
losing, minority parties the power to act like winning, majority parties -rules
this Article references as government in opposition rules -have spread around
the globe, infusing the fundamental law of dozens of democratic countries,
including countries as diverse as Argentina, Britain, Chile, Germany, and
South Africa. Such government in opposition rules helped resolve
constitutional crises in post-apartheid South Africa, are at the core of the
discussion about how to resolve the current political crisis in Zimbabwe, and
have dominated the constitutional discussions when leaders in Afghanistan and
Iraq met to draft their new constitutions.
The spread of government in opposition rules as a means of dividing power
among political groups is one of the most consequential innovations in
constitutional design in the past several decades. Indeed, when Great Britain
first experimented with government in opposition rules in the early nineteenth
century, then-Harvard University President Lawrence Lowell called it "the
greatest contribution of the nineteenth century to the art of government."' Yet
governments in opposition rules have received almost no attention in the
academic literature. In legal scholarship, there have been a few articles raising
the possibility of the occasional, obscure rule that permits minorities of various
1. A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND 451 (1924).
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sorts to exercise majority power,2 and a few articles mentioning in passing
specific examples of such rules.' In the political science literature, Arend
Lijphart makes an occasional, brief reference to government in opposition rules
when discussing his idea of "consociationalism,"4 but devotes little attention to
them, and unfortunately goes astray from government in opposition principles
in important respects. But even these few and brief academic discussions of
similar issues tend to focus on government in opposition rules as merely a
random set of quirky, disconnected, and largely insignificant rules. There has
been no discussion of how government in opposition rules-when grouped
together-can form part of a deliberate, new, and alternative form of
separation of powers.
This Article is an exercise in comparative and American constitutional law,
examining the constitutional approaches of many different countries in pursuit
of the most desirable constitutional structure, both in general for all
constitutional designers, and more specifically for the United States. This
Article is therefore a mix of the analytical and the normative; analytical in the
sense that this Article is presenting an innovative "new' s or "newer"
separation of powers that has eluded the attention of scholars to this point; and
normative in the sense that this Article offers a partial (albeit qualified)
endorsement of the many institutional virtues of this emerging addition to
separation of powers technologies, for the United States and for all other sorts
of constitutional democracies.
Part I will begin our exploration of government in opposition by examining
how constitutions around the world and in the United States have decided to
2. See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REv.
1385 (2008); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STA'i. L. REv. 1745 (2005)
[hereinafter Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding]; Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118
HARv. L. REv. lO99 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken, Second-Order Diversity]; Adrian Vermeule,
Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74 (2005). For
further discussion of these articles and their relationship to this Article, see infra Section
II.A.
3. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1051-52 (2004); Daryl J.
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2311, 2316,
2368-75 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 207 (1969) (discussing
how fragmented societies divide power among ethnic groups to preserve stability).
s. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REv. 633 (2000) (presenting the
idea of parliamentary democracies with constitutional courts as the "new" form of
separation of powers).
6. See Cindy Skach, The "Newest" Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L.
93 (2007) (arguing that semipresidential systems of separation of powers are an even more
recent system of separation of powers than the form Ackerman discusses).
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separate powers among winning and losing political coalitions.7 One of the
fundamental issues of constitutional design that countries have addressed as
part of these divisions of powers is how to divide authority among winning
political coalitions. Parliamentary systems largely avoid this question by
creating a singular winner who controls almost all of the levers of government.
By contrast, other systems (presidential and semipresidential) create the
potential for multiple winning political coalitions and divide bundles of
authority between these multiple winners among the branches or levels of
government, or within the branches of government.
But while these systems recognize and protect losing political parties, they
do not give these losing parties the substantial powers afforded to winning
coalitions to govern and to make law (what this Article will term "winners'
powers"). As Part II discusses, then, government in opposition rules differ
7. Two important points must be made about this very purposeful use of the phrase political
coalitions, and the discussion of how constitutions divide power among political coalitions.
First, there are other criteria that constitutions might use to divide authority among
different groups beyond which political coalition one belongs to-for instance, ethnic or
religious groups might be considered "majorities" or "minorities," rather than political
parties receiving more or less votes being considered as the relevant majorities and
minorities. In Canada, for instance, there is a polarizing debate about whether to grant
"asymmetrical powers for Quebec .... in order to give it the jurisdictional tools to preserve
and promote its [ethnic, linguistic and even religious] identity." Sujit Choudhry, Does the
World Need More Canada? The Politics of the Canadian Model in Constitutional Politics and
Political Theory, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 6o6, 632 (2007). In Lebanon, some governmental
positions have been apportioned according to religious background. See, e.g., Richard Hrair
Dekmejian, Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon, 1O COMP. POL. 251, 254
(1978) (discussing the situation in Lebanon whereby a ratio of six Christians to five
Muslims are seated in the Chamber and there is an even division in the Cabinet). This
Article, though, does not focus on ethnic or religious majorities or minorities and how
power is allocated between those groups, unless those cleavages are in some way relevant to
the distribution of power between electoral majorities and minorities.
A second important point about the use of the phrase "political coalition" is the
decision to use the word coalition rather than party. To the American reader, the use of the
word "coalition" is not necessary. As a practical matter, in the American system there is
competition between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, and so all I need
discuss is the division of power between the winning party and the losing party rather than
the winning and losing coalition, with some exceptions-such as Ross Perot winning
nineteen percent of the nationwide popular vote in 1992, and Ralph Nader perhaps tipping
the balance in the State of Florida to George W. Bush. See YANEK MIECZKOWSKI, THE
ROUTLEDGE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 142 (2001). More commonly,
though, the winner in democratic elections around the world consists of several parties, and
the loser also consists of several parties. Since this is an exploration of government in
opposition mostly in those countries, account must be taken of the presence of several
political parties on the winner and loser side, and so this Article refers to winning and losing
political coalitions rather than singular parties.
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from these other regimes of separation of powers not in their treatment of
winning coalitions, but in their treatment of losing coalitions, and their
recognition that losing political coalitions should also have the capacity to
exercise the power that winning coalitions usually posses to govern and to
make law. Part II focuses on the different mechanisms that have been used in
various countries to empower losing parties in this way-to give losers the
power to govern in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In several
other papers beyond this Article, I take up other tasks related to the discussion
in Part II of the emergence of government in opposition rules, such as
examining how these rules were created in part because they were seen as
better forms of protection for political minorities than judicial review, and how
the emergence of these rules has changed the nature of political opposition in
Western democracies, including the United States.
After Part II, this Article turns to a discussion of whether government in
opposition rules would be welcome additions to how the power to govern is
distributed, focusing first in Part III on how these rules benefit all
constitutional systems, and then in Part IV more specifically on what these
rules could add to the American constitutional system. As part of this analysis,
these Parts argue that government in opposition rules are constructive
additions to the institutional design of countries that fall anywhere on the
spectrum from the most to the least "fragile democracies." 8 Government in
opposition rules are welcome parts of constitutional systems, in other words,
for the over two-hundred-year-old Constitution of the United States, as well as
for the new and incredibly fragile constitution of Iraq.
As Part III discusses, government in opposition rules help resolve one of
the most problematic and underappreciated questions in constitutional design:
how to prevent a very successful political movement from gaining too much
control-what this Article calls the problem posed by the "illiberal democrat."9
8. See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 IARV. L. REv. 1405 (2007).
9. I borrow this phrase "illiberal democracy" from Fareed Zakaria. See FAREED ZAKARIA, THE
FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 17 (2003) ("Across the
globe, democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been re-elected or reaffirmed
through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limitations on their power and
depriving their citizens of basic rights."). Various other phrases have been used to describe
the phenomenon that Zakaria is describing, such as Guillermo O'Donnell's use of the phrase
"delegative democracy." See Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 1,
59-60 (1994) ("Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the
presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit."). But illiberal democracies and
delegative democracies are different from what is called "competitive" or "electoral"
authoritarianism. In that situation, the elections themselves are unfair, even beyond what
suppressions of rights follow from the elections. See Tom Ginsburg, Lessons from Democratic
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Whether it is a result of the actions of a Roosevelt or a Bush in the United
States - or a Blair or Putin overseas - constitutional democracies and the idea of
checks and balances are shaken to their cores when a hugely successful political
leader, elected apparently legitimately at the ballot box, captures all of the
branches and powers of government. This is because the other major
modalities of separation of powers, after either one election or many elections,
permit winning political coalitions to exercise almost unlimited power. Adding
government in opposition rules, by contrast, permits losing coalitions to
maintain real power and constrain successful political figures, regardless of
how successful particular winning coalitions might be in democratic elections.
Government in opposition rules not only better constrain winning
coalitions, but they also better train losing political coalitions -losing parties
under such rules have experience using the powers afforded by the
government, and therefore are ready to assume power should they win
elections or otherwise be called upon to exercise substantial control over the
levers of power. At bottom, losing political coalitions are also treated more
fairly, because when they receive a major portion of the vote, they are also
permitted control of major parts of the process of governing.
Part IV turns to the American scene, and discusses some of the benefits that
a framework government in opposition statute or constitutional amendment
would have for the American constitutional system. It suggests the adoption of
a regime that would guarantee that some significant number of executive,
legislative, and judicial positions of authority be granted to losing political
coalitions. Such a regime would help resolve the central crisis posed by the
current American separation of powers, that of "unified government," when
one political party controls all of the levers of power. This regime would ensure
that even during unified government, the dominant political coalition is
constrained. Moreover, this new regime would ensure that losing political
coalitions are adequately represented, in the political and bureaucratic process,
in a way that both parties when in power have prevented for decades. No
matter how much the winning political coalition might want, the main losing
political voices would not only be heard in our institutions of government, but
would also occasionally govern.
Transitions: Case Studies from Asia, 52 Ot3sIS 91, 92 (2008) ("Electoral authoritarianism refers
to a system with the apparent trappings of democracy, such as elections and a nominally
independent media and judiciary, in which channels for participation and accountability are
manipulated and constrained to ensure dominance of one faction.").
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I. SEPARATIONS OF POWERS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
WINNING POLITICAL COALITIONS AND LOSING POLITICAL
COALITIONS
As we will see in this Part, several centuries of constitutional design have
yielded many approaches to dividing authority among winning political
coalitions and losing political coalitions, in part by presenting different answers
to one of the central questions related to the constitutional separations of
powers: "How many elections should a political movement win before gaining
how much lawmaking authority?"10 One regime of separation of powers
("parliamentarism"") requires winning coalitions to win one election, and
solely by virtue of winning that one election, this political coalition
obtains "full authority."12  Other regimes ("[p]residentialism"'3  and
"semipresidentialism'"4 ) require winning coalitions to win several-and several
different types-of elections, and until and unless these winning coalitions
achieve these victories, such a constitution grants the various winning
coalitions different types of powers either within a branch and level of
government, or among the branches and levels of government. Separation of
powers regimes, in addition to addressing issues related to the allocation of
authority among winning coalitions, also provide protection for losing political
coalitions. But, as this Part will discuss and as Part II expands on, these
existing separation of powers technologies only recognize powers for losing
coalitions as losing coalitions -there is no provision for granting winning
coalitions' powers not just to electorally triumphant parties or coalitions, but
also to electorally defeated parties or coalitions.
lo. See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 643.
ii. See Skach, supra note 6, at 95 ("Parliamentarism is characterized by a fusion of powers and a
mutual dependence between the executive and the legislative powers. This is due to the fact
that the chief executive (usually a prime minister or chancellor) emanates from the
legislature after elections and needs the confidence of the legislature in order for his
government to survive the duration of the legislature's term.").
12. See Ackerman supra note 5, at 648 (defining full authority as when "the same party wins
enough elections in a row to take control of all the relevant powers").
13. See Skatch, supra note 6, at 95-96 ("Presidentialism is the opposite: it is a system
characterized by the separation of powers and a mutual independence of the executive and
legislative powers. This is because the chief executive (a popularly elected president) and the
legislature are elected independently of each other, for fixed terms of office, and both can
survive for their respective terms without the other's approval.").
14. See id. at 93 ("[S]emipresidentialism .... combines a popularly elected head of state with a
head of government who is responsible to a popularly elected legislature.").
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A. Terminological Preliminaries: Winners' Powers and Losers' Powers
This Article discusses political "winning coalitions" and political "losing
coalitions." The political coalition that receives a controlling share of the vote
in a democratic election is the "winner" of that election. When French
President Nicolas Sarkozy, for instance, was elected President of France on
May 6, 2007, The New York Times referenced his "triumph" and declared him
the "elected president" of France."5 And just as elections produce winning
parties or coalitions, they also produce losing parties or coalitions. The
Democratic Party and its nominee John Kerry lost the 2004 American
presidential election; Segolene Royal and the French Socialists lost the 2007
French presidential election. Elections, in other words, produce winning
political coalitions and losing political coalitions.
This is all obvious and basic so far, but the important point to be made is
not just that elections produce winning coalitions and losing coalitions, but
also that the powers afforded by government range on a continuum from the
ideal types of winners' powers to losers' powers. On one end of the conceptual
spectrum are winners' powers. The power to govern means having the capacity
to use the sovereign power of the state to order and coerce binding, obligatory
endeavors. The power to govern gives the entity exercising that power the
capacity to control the operations of entities of government in order to coerce
action. This might mean controlling the agenda of a committee or of a
legislature, or enacting statutes, or controlling a panel of judges that will issue
a binding decision. The power to govern, then, is a classic Weberian power,
meaning that it is really the power to control the legitimate use of violence by
the government.i6
On the other end of the conceptual spectrum are losers' powers. 17 Rather
than the power to use the sovereign capacity of the state to command and
control matters, losers' powers are the power to act as a minority, not the
power to act as a majority-losers' powers are powers to prevent the exercise of
winners' powers. Losers' powers can involve having the power to dissent, to
15. See Elaine Sciolino, Sarkozy, Elected in France, Vows Break With Past, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2007, at Al.
16. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOcIETY 56, 65 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoffet al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922).
17. The concept of losers' powers is also captured, albeit not in the legal or constitutional (and
more in the political) sense by George Tsebelis, who talks about "veto players," political
actors who have the power to prevent government from acting. See George Tsebelis,
Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism,
Multicameralism and Multiparryism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289 (1995).
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note the problems with what the government is doing. 8 Losers' powers can
involve the power to obstruct, to prevent winning coalitions from doing what
they so desire, as is seen via the usage of a special procedural mechanism such
as the legislative filibuster. Importantly, though, when an entity uses its losers'
powers, the power of government to act is not invoked, but rather is prevented
or forestalled from being invoked. Losers' powers are the power to block and
forestall; winners' powers are the power to legislate and to coerce.
Of course, in reality these conceptual extremes blur together. The filibuster
in the United States Senate might seem like an example of losers' powers,
because it permits a group of Senators to prevent the Senate from approving a
law. In practice, though, by filibustering one law, this group of Senators might
be forcing other Senators, the House of Representatives, and the President to
negotiate and bargain with them, thereby giving them more ability to influence
the enactment of a law - more ability to exercise, practically speaking, winners'
powers. So it is important to remember that within every power might be some
elements of winners' powers and some of losers' powers. The distinction is not
binary, but rather on a continuum.
It is important to distinguish between winning coalitions and losing
coalitions, and winners' and losers' powers, because this Part will examine how
these two axes of constitutional design have been used to create different
regimes of separation of powers in different countries. None of the traditional,
established regimes recognize that winners' powers and losers' powers do not
need to be granted exclusively to winning coalitions and to losing coalitions.
One of the innovations of government in opposition, then, is the structural
point that winning coalitions are not necessarily given all winners' powers, and
losing coalitions are not granted solely losers' powers. Winning coalitions can
be given losers' powers (which is presumably less controversial) but losing
coalitions can also be given some-and some substantial- winners' powers.
B. Apportioning Winners' Powers: Parliamentary and Presidential Regimes
Existing separation of powers regimes recognize a singular winning
coalition or multiple winning coalitions, and then allocate the substantial
18. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1752 ("This Article uses the term
'dissenter' in a more specific sense, to refer to someone who subscribes to an outlier view on
an issue that she deems salient to her identity. A dissenter is someone whom we would
naturally term an 'electoral minority' because of the positions she holds."); see, e.g., STEVEN
H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERiCA, at xi (1999) (defining
dissent as "speech that criticizes existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or
authorities").
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majority of winners' powers to the singular winner or among the several
winning coalitions. In parliamentary systems, there is a singular winner, and
this winner is granted the substantial majority of available winners' powers,
with very few constraints on these powers which are unrelated to the winning
coalitions' powers. In presidential and semipresidential systems, there are (or
at least can be' 9) multiple winning coalitions, and each winner is granted the
substantial majority of winners' powers that are associated either within a
different branch of government, a particular subdivision of one part of
government, or of a different level of government. This strategy, then, by
creating multiple winning coalitions and giving them separate and (often)
overlapping bundles of winners' powers to use against one another and to
further their power, ensures that, as James Madison famously said in Federalist
51, "ambition [is] made to counteract ambition."2 ° In none of these systems,
though, are losing coalitions given the power to control government.
First of all, in many parliamentary regimes, "a political movement need win
only one election before gaining plenary authority."2' This is because legislative
and executive powers are not separated, but are conjoined, and the winner of
an election is granted all of the legislative power, as well as all of the executive
power. A voter in these parliamentary systems casts a single ballot, for a
political party, and the party or parties receiving the most ballots then selects
(usually) the leader of their party2" to become the executive in control of the
19. Just as winning coalitions in parliamentary systems control all of the levers of power, so too
can winning coalitions in presidential and semipresidential systems control all of the levers
of power, but in the latter systems they must win several elections to do so. So, while in
parliamentary systems there is always one winner, in presidential systems there is the
possibility of more than one winner. When there is one winner that controls all of the
bundles of winning coalitions' powers in a presidential or semipresidential system
("unified" government), the unity of power causes problems in such a system similar to
those faced in parliamentary systems. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 3, at 2315
("Recognizing that these dynamics shift from competitive when government is divided to
cooperative when it is unified calls into question many of the foundational assumptions of
separation-of-powers law and theory.").
2o. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 268 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
2001).
21. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 643.
22. It is not always the case that the leader of the party receiving the most votes is selected as the
Prime Minister. In Japan, for instance, the Prime Minister selected after the 1993 election
was from the Socialist Party, not from the Liberal Democrats, even though that party had
three times as many seats. In Norway, after the 2001 election the Prime Minister was
selected from the fifth-most successful party, the Christian People's Party. See Geoffrey
Palmer, The Cabinet, The Prime Minister and the Constitution, 4 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 1, 25
n.55 (2006). The only limitation is that the Prime Minister selected must be from the
winning coalition, even if the Prime Minister is not from the plurality party.
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government. In Great Britain, for instance, in the 1997 elections forty-four
percent of those casting a ballot cast a singular ballot for Labour, thirty-one
percent for the Conservatives, seventeen percent for the Liberal Democrats, and
seven percent for other parties.23 Because this meant that the Labour Party won
418 out of 658 seats in the House of Commons, it became the majority party in
the Commons. The House of Commons selects the Prime Minister, and so led
by the Labour Party, the House of Commons selected Tony Blair to be the next
Prime Minister of Great Britain. This meant that, by virtue of winning the 1997
parliamentary elections, Blair controlled the executive branch, and elected
political figures associated with him controlled the legislative branch as well. A
leader in a British-style parliamentary regime must ensure that he or she
receives the support of the members of his winning coalition in the legislature
and in the cabinet, but this normally does not present problems for the British
Prime Minister, since unified party voting transpires "so close to loo percent
[of the time] that there [is] no ... point in measuring it.
" 4
In parliamentary systems, the primary political constraints on winning
coalitions and their exercise of winners' powers come from within the same
winning coalition-which means that all winners' powers are exercised by
winning coalitions. In presidential and semipresidential systems, another
source of constraint is the potential for the exercise of winners' powers by
several different winning coalitions. This is the strategy used in presidential
regimes: winning coalitions exercising winners' powers constraining other
winning coalitions and their exercise of winners' powers. The various winning
coalitions recognized by presidential regimes can either be located among the
branches of government (presidentialism), or both among and within a branch
of government (semipresidentialism).
In presidential systems, since there is a directly elected executive and a
separately elected legislature, there is the potential for different winning
coalitions, and each winner is granted its own bundle of winners' powers. As a
practical matter, since almost every presidential country with a legislature has
two houses in the legislature, this means that in presidential systems, rather
than there being a singular winner (as in a parliamentary system), there is the
potential for at least two and sometimes three winning coalitions: the winner
23. See Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart & Paul F. Whiteley, New Models for New Labour:
The Political Economy of Labour Parry Support, January 1992-April 1997, 92 AM. POL. S0. REV.
559, 559 n.1 (1998).
24. SAMUEL H. BEER, MODERN BRITISH POLITICS 350 (1965). This is true even though there is a
"higher incidence of backbench rebellion and dissent ... [since] the mid-196o's." Anthony
Mughan & Roger M. Scully, Accounting for Change in Free Vote Outcomes in the House of
Commons, 27 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 640, 640 (1997).
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of the presidency, and the winner of elections for each house of the legislature.
Therefore, while in parliamentary systems the checks on winning coalitions
come from within the winning coalition, in presidential systems the checks on
winning coalitions derive from the existence of other winning coalitions and
their usage of winners' powers. One key element of constitutional design,
though, remains the same, and differentiates these systems from government
in opposition: the checks on winning coalitions come from one version or
another of winning coalitions and winning coalitions utilizing winning
coalitions' powers.
Another version of presidential government, rather than creating the
potential for multiple winning coalitions, and granting them the bundles of
winning coalitions' powers that go with control of a particular branch of
government, is to divide up the bundles of powers that go with control of a
particular branch of government. This can happen with the executive branch,
where one winner (the directly elected executive) is granted one bundle of
executive winners' powers, and another winner (the executive accountable to
the legislative majority coalition) is granted another bundle of executive
winners' powers. This form of government is usually called
"semipresidentialism," and has grown in popularity in recent years. Indeed,
when the Berlin Wall fell and about thirty or so countries crafted constitutions,
the most common constitutional form chosen was semipresidentialism. s The
directly elected and superior executive, as one winner, is given certain winners'
powers; the deputy executive, as another winner, is given a certain bundle of
winning coalitions' powers, and then the winning coalitions of the elections for
the two branches of the legislature are given their own bundle of winning
coalitions' powers. The conflict-and the check-then operates in the same
manner that it does in a purely presidential regime. There are different
winning coalitions, and the winning coalitions are constrained by other
winning coalitions and by winner-related institutions exercising winning
coalitions' powers.
Another institutional variation of this notion of multiple winners exercising
overlapping bundles of winners' powers comes in the form of federalism. Even
more than winners' powers being granted to winners of federal elections, the
winners of various state elections are granted winners' powers. It is still the
case, though, that only winning coalitions are granted winners' powers -there
are just more and more varied winning coalitions because there are political
coalitions that have triumphed at the state level as well as at the federal level.
25. See Skach, supra note 6, at 93.
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Parliamentary, presidential, and semipresidential democracies all feature
institutions that cannot be categorized neatly as winning coalitions or losing
coalitions, and are what this Article calls "winner-related institutions." These
institutions -while not themselves elected and therefore not directly part of
winning coalitions-are appointed or empowered by winning coalitions.
Perhaps the most notable example of this-of winner-related institutions
exercising winners' powers- is the constitutional court, a court with the power
to invalidate laws passed by a legislature for running afoul of a constitution.
No matter how bureaucratic and nonpolitical the mentality of these
constitutional courts in all forms of democracies, by and large constitutional
court judges still are appointed through political processes controlled by
winning coalitions, 6 and they enter the judicial system already possessing
notoriety and reputations.2 7 The result is that, although in imperfect ways,
constitutional courts in parliamentary democracies have strong ties to winning
political coalitions because they are appointed by these winning coalitions.
This situation creates all sorts of principal-agent problems, meaning that
courts are imperfect winner-related institutions, but are winner-related
institutions nonetheless, and should the winner so desire, can be manipulated
by winning political coalitions. An extreme example of this comes from Japan.
In Japan, the justices of the supreme court are appointed by the party that
controls the executive branch,' 8 meaning the Prime Minister appointed by the
winning coalitions that control the Diet, the most powerful house of the
Japanese legislature. 9 The leaders of this all-powerful winning coalition
appointing the supreme court justices always "appoint justices, old enough
(generally in their early 6os) not to change their views before mandatory
z6. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, A Comparative View of the ChiefJustice's Role: Guardians of the
Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet
Europe, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1757, 1766 (2006) ("Constitutional judges are typically selected by
some combination of presidential or prime ministerial appointment and parliamentary
approval .... ). It is still the case, though, that there are elements of the judicial system that
cannot be called winner-related, because they operate using principles similar to the civil
service. See id. at 1767 ("Within countries that have constitutional courts, ordinary court
judges typically have civil service careers in which they enter the lower-level judiciary first
and are promoted up through the ranks on the basis of seniority and merit.").
27. See id. at 1768 ("Because the vast majority of constitutional judges enter the judiciary from
either academia or the higher reaches of politics, they are often well known before they issue
any decisions at all.").
28. See KENPO, art. 79, para. 1 ("The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such
number of judges as determined by law. All such judges except the Chief Judge shall be
appointed by the Cabinet.").
29. See id. art. 67, para. 1 ("The Prime Minister shall be designated from among the members of
the Diet by a resolution of the Diet.").
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retirement at age 70." '3 The result has been that "the Japanese Supreme Court
is deferential in the extreme."3'
It should also be noted that not all institutions in parliamentary or both
forms of presidential democracies can easily be characterized as obviously
controlled by winning coalitions or losing coalitions, and so there are some
sources of constraint even if winning coalitions succeed beyond the highest of
expectations. Some institutions, such as bureaucratic institutions32 or careerist
lower courts in some countries,33 are hardly related to winning or to losing
political coalitions. And parliamentary democracies still have presidents, who
might be from losing political parties, and can have significant powers in some
countries.
3 4
Despite these structural differences between parliamentary, presidential,
and semipresidential regimes, one fundamental similarity remains: the
traditional versions of these regimes all feature winners' powers that are
exercised either directly by winning political coalitions or by those appointed
30. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in
Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 331, 333 (2001).
31. Id.
32. This is particularly true in countries outside the United States, where fewer bureaucratic
officials tend to be political appointees. Compare PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT:
FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 7-13 (1995) ("Between 196o
and 1992, the number of department secretaries increased from iO to 14, the number of
deputy secretaries from 6 to 21, under secretaries from 14 to 32, deputy under secretaries
from just 9 to 52, assistant secretaries from 81 to 212, deputy assistant secretaries from 77 to
507."), with Pablo T. Spiller & Santiago Urbiztondo, Political Appointees vs. Career Civil
Servants: A Multiple Principals Theory of Political Bureaucracies, io EuR. J. POL. ECON. 465
(1994) (noting that there are fewer political appointees outside the United States).
33. Germany has largely adopted the system used by West Germany, in which "German judges,
after a three to five year probationary period, become career state employees with lifetime
tenure. Whatever political influence exists on the recruitment and promotion of state
judges, it is less than that for federal judges and is mediated mostly through state
administrative bureaucracies and candidate self-selection." David S. Clark, The Selection and
Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1795, 1816 (1988).
34. Indeed, as one article discusses, the range of prominent powers held by presidents can
include
the president's exclusive discretion to dissolve parliament (Italy), the requirement
of countersignatures of cabinet decrees (Italy), suspensory veto over legislation
(Czech Republic, Slovakia), the power to decree new laws (Greece for some time
after 1975), and appointments to high offices, sometimes (as in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia) including ministries.
Scott Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A
Critical Appraisal, 29 COMP. POL. 449, 451 (1997).
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or otherwise strongly controlled by winning political coalitions. In
parliamentary regimes, there is always a singular political winner; in
presidential and semipresidential regimes, there are multiple political winners.
But no matter what, winners' powers are exercised by those political coalitions
that, at one point or another, won a democratic election or curried the favor of
those who won such an election. If you wanted to govern in any of the major
constitutional democratic systems around the world, at least until recently, you
had to win some form of election.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION: GOVERNMENT IN
OPPOSITION
After several hundred years of constitutional government, the manners in
which powers are divided into constitutional democracies are relatively finite,
as Part I discussed. Winners' powers are given either to singular or multiple
winning political coalitions; and losers' powers are given to losing political
coalitions. What has happened in the past several decades, though, has been
the adoption of the idea that constraint and checks in separation of powers can
be provided not just by dispersing winners' powers among winning coalitions,
but by actually granting such powers to losing political coalitions. As this Part
will discuss, in the constitutions, statutes, and other foundational legal
commitments recognized in many countries, the coercive, decisional power of
the state is granted to those losing elections as well as those winning elections.
To be clear, government in opposition is not a type of democratic system
on its own, but rather an aspect of a democratic system. In countries with
government in opposition rules, such rules do not obviate the question of
whether there should be an independently elected executive (as in a
presidential or semipresidential system) or whether the chief executive should
be selected by another directly elected institution (the legislature, as in a
parliamentary system); whether there should be two houses of the legislature
or a single house of the legislature, and so on. In other words, there are still
other foundational questions about what institutions to create, and what
powers each institution should exercise.
Even though constitutional designers have to resolve other questions of
institutional structure in addition to questions about government in opposition
rules, it is also the case that every constitutional system has to consider whether
to adopt government in opposition rules. Arend Lijphart has argued that some
forms of power-sharing are better suited for parliamentary than
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semipresidential or presidential democracies," but it is emphatically the case
that all forms of democracies have government in opposition rules.
Parliamentary systems such as Britain and Germany have these rules;
presidential systems such as Argentina and the United States have these rules;
and semipresidential systems like Slovakia have these rules. In this way,
whether to have government in opposition rules (and how many and what
kinds to have) forms one of the few genuinely universal questions of
institutional design that must be addressed and resolved by all constitutional
designers in all democracies -and, as this Part will discuss, by all branches of
democratic government.
A. An Unnoticed Innovation in Constitutional Form
This Part will discuss the various forms of government in opposition rules,
and the key design questions that countries implementing these rules face,
before turning to some examples of how these rules are used with great
significance by all the branches of government that constitutional democracies
have known. This discussion and typology of how government in opposition
rules work and how they matter is necessary because, as mentioned briefly
earlier, scholars have not really noticed government in opposition rules.
Heather Gerken and Adrian Vermeule have both written helpfiil articles
identifying a genre of rules which permit those in the minority to act as
majorities on occasion. Vermeule labeled these rules "submajority rules," which
he has defined as rules which permit "a voting minority ... the affirmative
power to change the status quo. ' ' , 6 Likewise, Gerken examines what she
3S. See Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 96, lO
(2004) (arguing that power-sharing among parties works better in parliamentary systems
because "the cabinet in a parliamentary system is a collegial decision-making body-as
opposed to the presidential one-person executive with a purely advisory cabinet-it offers
the optimal setting for forming a broad power-sharing executive"); see also Mainwaring &
Shugart, supra note 34, at 454 ("[M]ost presidential democracies offer greater prospects of
dividing the cabinet among several parties. This practice, which is essentially unknown
among the Westminster parliamentary democracies, is common in multiparty presidential
systems."). This Article later discusses how Lijphart goes astray in including other forms of
institutional structures along with government in opposition rules in his prescription of
consociationalism. In addition, the descriptive part of Lijphart's project misses out on how
many countries are either partly or substantially consociational, or at least have substantial
government in opposition rules, because his primary argument is that "consociationalism
was successful in Belgium since the end of World War I, Lebanon from 1943 to 1975, and in
Malaysia since 1955." Jurg Steiner, Consociational Democracy as a Policy Recommendation: The
Case of South Africa, 19 COMP. POL. 361, 364 (1987).
36. Vermeule, supra note 2, at 74.
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entitles, in different places, "second-order diversity" and "dissenting by
deciding," which Gerken defines as "dissent taking the form of state action....
[in] disaggregated [institutions]."' For both Vermeule and Gerken, though,
this genre of rules empowering minorities are merely idiosyncratic phenomena,
appearing in (somewhat) random and inconsequential places in political and
social life; neither scholar appreciates how these rules have effected a
revolution in constitutional separation of powers around the world. 
8
If there is any area of scholarship that has recognized the comprehensive
significance of government in opposition rules, it is the debate about Arend
Lijphart's notion of "consociational democracy."39 But Lijphart's discussion of
these minority governance rules as systemic, government in opposition rules
occurs when he groups together government in opposition rules with other
types of rules, creating what he calls "consociational democracy," which is
characterized by government in opposition rules and other features. Beyond
the basic idea of government in opposition- that losing parties should exercise
winners' powers, which are reflected in the "grand coalition" and
"proportionality" parts of consociationalism-Lijphart adds a series of other
rules that he argues are necessary parts of being classified as a consociational
democracy.
Lijphart also requires that each different political group have a mutual veto
over major policy decisions affecting all groups,40 and that each group exercises
"segmental authority" -the authority for each group to make its own policies,
affecting only its own communities -for a regime to be consociational .
4
Because of this grouping together of government in opposition rules with other
sorts of institutional arrangements, the precise benefits of these government in
opposition rules in particular-not to mention how they came into existence
and how they compare to other modalities of separating power-are lost. As
37. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2, at 1747-48.
38. Indeed, Vermeule seems to believe that his "submajority rules" function primarily, if not
exclusively, as transparency devices which empower political minorities to demand public
accountability of majorities. See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 74 ("Submajority rules enable
minorities to force public accountability and transparency upon majorities, thereby
increasing the force of principled deliberation and argument in official decisionmaking.").
The sorts of rules that Vermeule is discussing give losing coalitions winners' powers that
command winning coalitions to do things, such as provide information. In fact, though, as
this Part discusses, government in opposition rules extend far beyond simply permitting
minorities to demand sunlight be placed on majorities; they also give minorities real
decisional authority.
39. See Lijphart, supra note 4, at 207.
40. See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOcRAcY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 36-38 (1977).
41. Id. at 41-44.
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Part III discusses, government in opposition rules constrain the exercise of
winners' powers in substantial but not excessive ways; when grouped together
with the mutual veto and segmental autonomy aspects of consociationalism,
Lijphart's vision of power-sharing constrains the exercise of winners' powers
all too much by reinforcing political polarization and cleavages.
B. A Typology of the Innovation in Constitutional Form
One of the results of government in opposition rules not being studied as
their own, distinctive, separately important phenomenon is that the many
forms and types of government in opposition rules have been ignored. Before
the emergence of government in opposition rules is presented, and the
normative virtues of these rules are discussed, we must first understand the
various forms of government in opposition rules. As the next two Parts will
discuss, some aspects of government in opposition rules are more redeeming
than others.
One type of variation in government in opposition rules is the degree of
legal or other coercion involved in the exercise of winners' powers by losing
coalitions. Consider the first type of rule, the mandatory government in
opposition rule. This sort of rule means that, regardless of the preferences of
the winning political coalition, losing political coalitions must exercise winners'
powers.
The exact nature or legal source of the mandatory part of these rules might
vary. For instance, the interim constitution that South Africa adopted in 1994
required that parties receiving a certain percentage of the vote be granted
executive deputy president positions.42 Some of the powers that the losing
political coalition enjoys in Britain derive from a series of statutes enacted over
the years, or from internal rules adopted by the legislature.43 The mandatory
42. See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 84(1) ("Every party holding at least 8o seats in the
National Assembly shall be entitled to designate an Executive Deputy President from among
the members of the National Assembly.") (emphasis added).
43. The financial and other resource support that is provided to the opposition from the public
fisc is a function of statute. See Ministerial and Other Salaries Act, 1997, c. 62 (Eng.);
Ministerial and Other Salaries Act, 1975, c. 27 (Eng.); Ministers of the Crown Act, 1937, 1
Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 38 (Eng.). Some issues of resource support are defined by orders-in-
council, another form of legislation (one that is made under the name of the Queen by the
Privy Council). See Ministerial and Other Salaries Order, 1994, S.I. 1994/32o6 (U.K)
(increasing salaries); Ministerial and Other Salaries Order, 1991, S.I. 1991/2886 (U.K)
(increasing salaries); Ministerial and Other Salaries Order, 1987, S.t. 1987/1836 (U.K)
(increasing salaries). Some other elements of losing coalition power, such as control over the
proceedings of Parliament at certain moments, are provided by legislative rule. See AUTH. OF
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part of the mandatory government in opposition rule might also stem from an
informal-albeit practically binding-convention. In Argentina, the losing
political coalition receives a certain percentage of committee chair positions,
not by the command of a formal constitutional, statutory, or legislative rule,
but as a matter of informal convention.'
In contrast to mandatory government in opposition rules are rules which
merely permit losing political coalitions to exercise winners' powers. Contrast,
for instance, the rule in the South African interim constitution requiring losing
parties to be given executive deputy president positions with the situation in
Great Britain during World War II. During World War II, Great Britain
formed a "war cabinet," meaning a cabinet composed of members of many
different political coalitions, including the chief opposition party of Prime
Minister Winston Churchill's Conservative government, the Labour Party, and
its leaders. 41 Churchill was under no obligation to appoint these opposition
leaders, but did so of his own volition.
We could also add a third permutation of answers to the question of
whether losing political coalitions are guaranteed by law to exercise winners'
powers. In addition to government in opposition rules requiring this result, or
those permitting this result, we can also imagine rules which do not require
government in opposition, but do more than merely permit it; they actually
encourage it (so perhaps these rules fall on the spectrum between rules
permitting government in opposition and those which mandate government in
opposition). One genre of rule that could encourage opposition parties to
exercise winners' powers is a supermajority voting rule. It might be the case
that the majority has a sufficient supermajority to be able to exercise all
winners' powers without needing the votes of members of losing coalitions.
More likely still, the majority in a particular governmental entity might not
have the requisite supermajority, but from time to time might be able to secure
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, STANDING ORDER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 15, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2007o8/cmstords/1o5/io 5 .pdf. Other parts of
government in opposition in Britain stem from practically binding conventions, such as
those providing that the opposition party will chair the Public Accounts Committee. See
HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, FACTSHEET P2 PROCEDURE SERIES (JUNE 2009), available
at http://vww.parliament.uk/documents/upload/Po2.pdf.
44. See HONORABLE CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE LA NAC16N, REGLAMENTO DE LA CviARA DE
DIPUTADOS DE LA NACI6N, COMENTADO POR GUILLERMO CARLOS SCHINELLI (Direcci6n de
Informaci6n Parlamentaria 1996).
45- See STEVEN F. HAYWARD, CHURCHILL ON LEADERSHIP: EXECUTIVE SUCCESS IN THE FACE OF
ADVERSITY 146 (1997).
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the votes of members of the minority in order to achieve the requisite
supermajority margin for particular votes.46
But supermajority rules also could lead to a situation where, rather than
constantly trying to achieve minority votes in order to obtain the supermajority
margin, the minority itself can exercise winners' powers a certain part of the
time. In Germany, for instance, "[h]alf the members of the Federal
Constitutional Court [(FCC)] [are] elected by the Bundestag and half by the
Bundesrat."4 In practice, "[t]he Bundestag appoints its members through a
two-thirds vote of a Judicial Selection Committee . . . and the Bundesrat
through a two-thirds vote of the body as a whole. ''48 The result has been that
losing political parties as well as winning political parties have been able to
nominate and appoint many of their own candidates to the FCC,4 9 and this
system of losing political coalitions appointing judges because of supermajority
rules is true of the appointments process for constitutional courts in several
other countries as well."0 This has become the negotiated solution to the
supermajority requirement; it is a government in opposition rule because it
means that losing parties actually appoint judges to the FCC, and the
framework FCC statute does not require it, but certainly encourages this by
virtue of the supermajority requirement.
In addition to the question of how aggressively to require or encourage -or
permit- losing political coalitions to exercise winners' powers in the first place,
there is also the question of how to determine the precise amount of
46. This would be the situation, for instance, in a United States Senate where the majority party
has sixty or more senators. In a situation where the majority political coalition does not have
a filibuster-proof majority, it has two choices. It can make ad hoc arrangements, which is
what happened as a result of the battle over judicial appointments in the United States in
2005. Fourteen United States Senators - seven Democrats and seven Republicans - reached
an agreement about how to handle particular judicial appointments, and reached a vague
agreement about how to handle later appointments. See Charles Babington & Shailagh
Murray, A Last-Minute Deal on Judicial Nominees, WASH. POST, May 24, 2005, at A1. The
other choice, though, is to reach a more permanent arrangement that permits the losing
political coalition to exercise winners' powers some of the time, and in return that the losing
political coalition will support the exercise of winners' powers by winning coalitions the rest
of the time.
47. Grundgesetz ftir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law], May 8, 1949, art. 93
(F.R.G.).
48. Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, 3 THEORETICAL
INQUIRY L. 49, 68 n.40 (2002).
49. See DONALD P. KoMMvERS, THE FEDERAL CONSTrTIONAL COURT 120-28 (1994) (tracing this
system all the way back to the first appointment of Constitutional Court Justices in 1951).
50. See Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 67 (discussing similar approaches implemented in
constitutional systems around the world, including in Bulgaria, Korea, and Mongolia).
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government in opposition rules that a democratic system will feature. The
means to determine the precise amount of government in opposition rules that
a system will feature really vary on two axes, the first axis being how often these
rules determining the amount of winners' powers are revisited and revised, and
the second axis being what formula is used to determine how many government
in opposition rules there should be when these rules are examined (regardless
of how often this revisiting of the amount of government in opposition rules
might or might not transpire). In other words, democratic systems first have to
answer whether the exact amount of government in opposition should befixed
or negotiated, and then whether government in opposition rules should be
proportionate or determined according to some other formula.
Some countries set in advance the exact amount of government in
opposition power that will be exercised. The "Seven Member Rule" in the
United States is a federal statute that empowers seven members of the House
Committee on Government Operations or five members of the Committee on
Governmental Affairs of the Senate to compel information of "[a]n executive
agency."'" There is no negotiation or discussion after each election, or after
each house of Congress is convened for a new session, to determine if members
of the relevant committees shall have the power to compel information. That
power for losing groups in Congress is fixed, in this case by statute.
This fixed amount of government in opposition power to be exercised can
be done by either fixing a formula -for instance, the understanding in Portugal
that losing political coalitions will have the same percentage of committee chair
positions as they occupy seats in the legislature 2 -or actually fixing a more
precise, party-specific result, as is done in Switzerland, where since the 1959
elections the main four political parties are each given a certain number of
cabinet positions (and that amount did not change based on the results of later
elections). After the 1959 elections in Switzerland, the Zauberformel ("magical
formula") was created, which provided that the Free Democratic Party (FDP)
would be given two cabinet positions, the Christian Democratic People's Party
(CVP) would be given two cabinet positions, the Social Democratic Party
(SPS) would be given two positions, and the Swiss People's Party (SVP) would
be given one position. 3 The alternative to these forms of fixing the amount of
government in opposition power is to leave it up to negotiation after the
51. 5 U.S.C. § 2954 (2006).
52. See NAT'L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT'L AFFAIRS, PAPER NO. 2, COMMIT-EES IN
LEGISLATURE: A DRvISION OF LABOR 16 (1996).
53. See Gerhard Lehmbruch, Consociational Democracy and Corporatism in Switzerland, 23
PUBLIUS 43, 5O-51 (1993).
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relevant election. For instance, the precise number of committee chair positions
to be allocated to the opposition party in the British House of Commons varies
from election to election, based on negotiations.5 4
This addresses the questions of how the exact amount of government in
opposition is determined, but there is also a question of how much government
in opposition there will be. In general, this question seems to be answered one
of two ways: (1) winners' powers are divided proportionately (which, as was
just mentioned, is used to apportion committee chair positions in Portugal), or
(2) winners' powers are divided through some other mechanism. For instance,
in Canada certain legislative committees - not necessarily in an amount
proportionate to the number of seats held by that party in the legislature -are
traditionally chaired by the opposition party (in particular, the Public Accounts
Committee in Canada is traditionally chaired by the opposition party)."5
The final variable in the institutional design of government in opposition
rules is whether they are generally applicable, or whether they permit only losing
coalitions to exercise potentially available winners' powers. A generally
applicable government in opposition rule is one that would permit any group
not having a majority of the votes-no matter how constituted (meaning it
could be constituted of defecting members of the winning political coalition as
well as of members of the losing political coalition) -to exercise winners'
powers. The contrasting sort of rule is one that permits a minority grouping to
exercise winners' powers, but that minority grouping can be constituted only
of members of a losing political coalition.
The Seven Member Rule in the U.S. Congress mentioned earlier is a
generally applicable rule, in that it permits any seven members of the House
Committee on Government Operations and any five members of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate to compel information,
regardless of whether these seven/five members are from the winning or from
the losing political coalition.s6 By contrast, the rules in the interim South
African Constitution which entitled losing political coalitions to hold executive
deputy president positions are not generally applicable government in
opposition rules, and instead only provide for the exercise of executive power
54. See HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, supra note 43.
55- See C.E.S. Franks, The Dilemma of the Standing Committees of the Canadian House of
Commons, 4 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 461, 464 (1971).
56. See 5 U.S.C. § 2954 ("An Executive agency, on request of the Committee on Government
Operations of the House of Representatives, or of any seven members thereof, or on request of
the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, or any five members thereof, shall




by the political parties who did not constitute the winning political coalition in
the previous election. The interim constitution provided that any "party
holding at least 8o seats in the National Assembly" has the authority to appoint
its own executive deputy president.
5 7
C. The Forms of Government in Opposition
Before turning to the normative virtues of government in opposition rules
in the next Part, this Section discusses the forms of government in opposition
rules in the various branches of government. s8 Government in opposition rules
exist for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, in all forms of
constitutional democracies. And in all forms of constitutional democracies,
government in opposition rules have been structurally important aspects of the
political dynamic.
1. Legislative Government in Opposition
First, in the legislative branch, losing political coalitions are sometimes
given the power to chair standing or temporary committees, or are given
special powers on a committee even if they do not chair the committee. In
several countries, losing political coalitions chair important legislative
committees. In Germany, losing political coalitions hold several important
committee chair positions. The chair positions of these committees are
allocated based on the percentage of seats held by a political coalition in the
legislature. If a political party occupies thirty percent of the seats in the
Bundestag, that party will receive thirty percent of the committee chair
positions.5 9 There are other countries -a mix of parliamentary, presidential,
and semipresidential- which use the same system as Germany and Portugal,
with a mandatory (legislative rule), fixed, proportional system of government
in opposition when it comes to committee chair positions.6 ° In Great Britain,
57. S.AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 84(0).
58. One other regime of note is the regime in a growing number of countries providing
operational and other funding only for losing political coalitions. See Richard S. Katz & Peter
Mair, Changing Models of Parry Organization and Parry Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel
Party, 1 PARTY POL. 5, 17 (1995) ("Access to state subventions is also unaffected; indeed, in
some systems, such as Ireland and the UK, parties currently in opposition are actually
accorded a higher level of subvention precisely because they lack the immediate resources of
parties currently in government.").
59. See NAT'L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 52, at 16.
6o. See id.
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while there is an informal norm of granting losing political coalitions
committee chair positions, the precise number of committee chair positions
occupied by the losing political coalition fluctuates based on negotiations, not
based on the fixed proportional system used by Germany and Portugal (this
floating allocation of committee chair positions to losing coalitions is also true
of the system of committee assignments in parliamentary Canada,
semipresidential Slovakia," and presidential Argentina62). Indeed, in the
current British Parliament, the opposition Conservatives and Liberal
Democrats together hold more committee chair positions than the governing
Labour Party does.6"
There is a wide variation in the powers that committee chairs exercise, but
even in the countries with the weakest powers afforded to committee chairs,
this genre of government in opposition rules can make a major difference. In
Great Britain, where committee chairs tend to have less power than in other
democracies,' 4 the winners' powers exercised by the member of the opposition
party chairing the Public Accounts Committee6 has often been quite
important. In 2005 and 2006, against the wishes of the Labour government of
Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Public Accounts Committee, led by
Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Edward Leigh (Con-
61. In Slovakia, the opposition members control the Environment Committee-and thus
Slovakia's position on global warming -by holding not just the chair but also a majority
vote of fifteen to five votes.
62. See Mark P. Jones & Wonjae Hwang, Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending
Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 267, 277 (2005) (stating that
losing political coalitions occupied twenty-three percent of committee chair positions
between 1989 and 2003).
63. Labour currently holds nine committee chairs, while the Conservatives hold six chairs and
the Liberal Democrats hold four. See UK Parliament, Parliamentary Committees, Commons
Select Committees, http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary-committees/parliamentary
-committees16.cfm (last visited Nov. ii, 2oo9).
64. See COLIN PILKINGTON, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOcRACY IN BRITAIN TODAY 183-205 (1997).
65. The Public Accounts Committee in the House of Commons has traditionally been chaired
by a member of the losing political coalition. See Nevil Johnson, Opposition in the British
Political System, 1997 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 487, 492. That Committee examines "the
accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public
expenditure, and [since 1934] of such other accounts laid before Parliament as the
Committee may think fit." See UK Parliament, Committee of Public Accounts,
http ://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary-committees/committee-of public accounts.cfm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2009).
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Gainsborough),66 commenced a series of investigations into the practices of
Blair's Home Office (akin to the American Attorney General) in dealing with
foreign nationals when they are released from prison, particularly in the case of
rejected asylum-seekers.67
Because Leigh and the Public Accounts Committee possessed powers to
compel the Home Office to provide information, the Blair Government had no
choice but to cooperate with this Conservative-led investigation. Eventually,
this investigation uncovered that many foreign nationals denied asylum had
been improperly released into society and had committed a range of violent
crimes such as murder or various sexual offenses.68 Because of this
Conservative-led effort by the Public Accounts Committee, Blair removed one
of the giants of his party, Charles Clarke, from his position as Home
Secretary,6' and Clarke's resignation made Blair and the Labour Party drop
rapidly in national polls.
Even when losing political coalitions are not given all of the winners'
powers that are associated with chairing an entire legislative committee, they
are still sometimes given specific, discrete winners' powers afforded to
legislative committees. In the American Congress, there is the Seven Member
Rule referenced earlier. In several countries, in a system modeled after a series
of rules in the German Bundestag, committee minorities have even broader
winners' powers; losing political coalitions have 'One-Fourth Powers' and
'One-Third Powers.' One-fourth of the members on any Bundestag committee
may discharge an issue under consideration by the committee and force the
entire Bundestag to discuss it,7 0 force hearings on issues,7 ' and call witnesses to
such hearings. z2
Losing political coalitions have used these discrete winners' powers to great
effect. In 2004, for instance, when the Republicans controlled the presidency
66. See UK Parliament, Committee of Public Accounts, Members, http://
www.parliament.uk/parliamentary-committees/committee-ofpublic-accounts/committee
ofipublic accountsmembers.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2009).
67. See MP Dubs Home Office 'Incompetent,' BBC NEWS, Apr. 25, 20o6, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/ukpolitics/4944786.stm.
68. See Oliver King et al., Blair Backs Clarke To 'Put Things Right,' GUAR.DIAN, Apr. 26, 20o6,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/o,,329465S77-lo8iol,oo.html.
69. See Clarke Is Fired in Cabinet Purge, BBC NEWS, May 5, 20o6, http://news.bbc.co.uk/i/hV
uk-politics/4975938.stm.
70. See Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag, July 2, 198o, BGBI. I at 1273, last amended
by Gesetz [G], Feb. 12, 1998, BGBI. I at 428, art. VII, rule 69a(5) (F.R.G.).
71. Id. art. VII, Rule 70(l).
72. Id. art. VII, Rule 70(2).
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and both houses of Congress, the senior Democrat on the House Committee
on Government Reform, Henry Waxman from California, used the Seven
Member Rule to pressure the Bush Administration to release certain
information about the cost of the new Medicare prescription program after the
Administration initially refused to do so. 73 The release of these cost estimates
for the prescription plan caused problems for the Bush Administration, since
the cost of the plan was much higher than expected. Representative Waxman
also used the Seven Member Rule on other occasions.74
Losing political coalitions have also been granted a form of winners'
powers by being given the authority to compel information from winning
coalitions. These winners' powers can come in the form of an "elite"
information disclosure law limited to elite political figures, 5 or an information
disclosure law to be utilized by any member of the general public. The most
prominent form of elite information disclosure law is the "Question Days"
procedure used in several parliamentary democracies, and most recently
suggested for the United States by former Republican presidential nominee
John McCain. 76 The Question Days procedure permits losing coalitions to
compel information about any topic, either in writing or on the floor of the
legislature; there are also more narrow practices that permit losing political
coalitions to obtain information about narrower, more specific matters, such as
73. Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, House of Representatives,
to Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Mar. 2, 2004) (on file
with author).
74. See Waxman v. Evans, No. CVo14 53oLGB(AJWX), 2002 WL 32377615 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18,
2002) (deciding that the Bush Administration had an obligation to release certain census
data), rev'd as moot, 52 F. App'x 84 (9th Cir. 2002 ). Importantly, the district court in this
case rejected any notion that the Seven Member Rule presented a nonjusticiable political
question. Id. at *3-4.
75. The Seven Member Rule, mentioned earlier, supra note 51, functions as a form of elite
information disclosure law, permitting losing political coalitions -not the general public -
to compel information from executive agencies. The general public has its own Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), but in many important respects FOIA does not sweep as broadly as
the Seven Member Rule. For instance, the Seven Member Rule states that "[a]n [e]xecutive
agency ... shall submit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the
jurisdiction of the committee." 5 U.S.C. § 2954 (20o6) (emphasis added). By contrast, FOIA
includes a list of exceptions to its disclosure requirements. See id. § 552(b).
76. See George F. Will, Op-Ed., McCain's Question Time, WASH. POST, May 29, 2008, at 19
(quoting McCain as stating that he "will ask Congress to grant me the privilege of coming
before both houses to take questions, and address criticism, much the same as the prime
minister of Great Britain appears regularly before the House of Commons"). Sudha Setty
has recently written an article advocating the same. See Sudha Setry, The President's Question




security briefings provided to opposition political candidates. 77 In Britain, the
former leader of the Conservative Party, Michael Howard, used the Qiuestion
Days procedure during the years preceding the 20o6 national election to great
effect, including in July 2004 when he requested information about Blair's
education policies that led to Blair having to admit that his policies were a
"scandal. ''78 The British media quickly noted that this admission was a victory
for Howard, made possible by his usage of the Question Days procedure.7 9
In addition to controlling all or part of the operations of a particular
committee, losing political coalitions sometimes exercise the winners' powers
that go along with controlling the operations of the entire legislative body. In
Canada, the chief opposition party is granted control of the House of
Commons for twenty days a year.so The opposition receives control of the
legislature for the same number of days in Great Britain and New Zealand. s'
During these days when the minority controls the legislature -called either
"Opposition Days" or "Supply Days" -the losing political coalition is able to
overrule or defeat motions or items put forward by the winning coalition, and
to control the debate in the legislature. 82
2. Executive Government in Opposition
Because of an increasingly common series of institutional changes, losing
political coalitions also exercise winners' powers in the executive branch, while
maintaining their identity as active members of the losing political coalition. In
South Africa, the Interim Constitution of 1993 guaranteed executive positions
for members of losing political coalitions. If a political party received at least
77. In New Zealand, for instance, the Security Intelligence Service is mandated to brief the
leader of the losing coalition as well as the Prime Minister, providing information about
national security and other threats. See DEP'T OF THE PRIME MINISTER & CABINET,
SECURING OUR NATION'S SAFETY (2000), http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications/
securingoursafety/sis.html. A similar system has been followed in the United States with
minority members of certain committees in Congress and with presidential candidates. See
Eric Lipton, Security Briefings for the Other Guy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, at A12.
78. 423 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 831-33.
79. See Blair Admits Schools Literacy 'Scandal,' DAILY MAIL, July 7, 2004, http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3o9438/Blair-admits-schools-literacy-scandal.html.
8o. Inside Canada's Parliament: The Institution, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Informatiornlibrary/
inside/institutions-e.htm#role (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
8,. See AUTH. OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, STANDING ORDER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 18
(2007), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2oo7o8/cmstords/lo5/
lo5.pdf.
82. See Inside Canada's Parliament: The Institution, supra note 8o.
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eighty seats in the National Assembly -meaning at least twenty percent of the
seats of the 400-member National Assembly8,- then it was guaranteed to have
a member of the party appointed as Executive Deputy President.8 4 The
Executive Deputy President had many powers, including working with the
President of South Africa regarding "the development and execution of the
policies of the national government,, 8, making decisions about cabinet
appointments,86 and even presiding over Cabinet meetings if the President so
directed."'
During the first election held after the interim constitution went into force,
two parties won at least eighty seats-the African National Congress (ANC),
led by Nelson Mandela, and the National Party (NP), led by F.W. de Klerk
(the ANC won 252 seats in the National Assembly,88 and the National Party
captured 82 seats89). This meant that the government of South Africa featured
one Executive Deputy President put forward by the ANC (Thabo Mbeki) and
one Executive Deputy President put forward by the National Party (F.W. de
Klerk). While Mbeki followed the policies of his fellow ANC member
Mandela, de Klerk used his powers as Executive Deputy President to push
policies contrary to what Mandela and his overwhelming ANC majority
wanted,9° in particular, policies related to questions about "language rights,
education and affirmative action in the civil service and elsewhere."'" Beyond
South Africa's regime under the 1993 Interim Constitution, other countries -
including most notably Austria, Colombia, Great Britain, and Italy-have at
various times required, either by law or by informal norm, that members of
83. See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 40(0).
84. Id. art. 84 ("Every party holding at least 8o seats in the National Assembly shall be entitled
to designate an Executive Deputy President from among the members of the National
Assembly.").
85. Id. art. 82(2).
86. id. art. 88.
87. Id. art. 89.
88. See Bill Keller, The Overview; South Africans Hail President Mandela; First Black Leader Pledges
Racial Unity, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at I.
89. Alexander Johnston, South Africa: The Election and the Emerging Party System, 70 INT'L AFF.
721, 729 (1994).
go. The interim South African Constitution also provided that the heads of cabinet departments
were to be allocated in proportion to the number of seats held by a particular political party
in the National Assembly, the South African legislature. See S. AmR. (Interim) CONST. 1993
art. 88(2).
91. J.E. Spence, Opposition in South Africa, 32 GOV'T&OPPOSITION 522, 534 (1997).
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losing political coalitions exercise executive government in opposition winners'
powers.
These examples of executive government in opposition are highly
consequential, because cabinet ministers in parliamentary and presidential
systems exercise substantial authority. In parliamentary systems, "only the
minister in charge of the relevant department is in a position to present [a]
policy proposal at cabinet, giving him or her a privileged position in the policy
area in question."92 In presidential or semipresidential systems, as well as in
parliamentary systems, members of the winning coalition are often too busy or
otherwise disinclined to overrule or interrupt the actions of the losing political
coalition exercising winners' powers. Simply put, "a high workload, coupled
with the relatively small size of the cabinet and policy specialization by
ministers, means that the precise content and wording of a bill are usually
decided by the cabinet minister under whose jurisdiction a bill falls." 93 If that
cabinet minister is from the losing political coalition, then, that means that
they do more than propose law to the chief executive; they actually make law,
on their own and most of the time.
These systems of executive government in opposition need to be
distinguished from coalition or nonpartisan forms of executive government,
where there are political figures originally from losing political coalitions
exercising executive winners' powers, but where these political figures have one
way or another forsaken or at least compromised their identity as oppositional
political leaders. For instance, there are many examples of previously
oppositional partisan figures occupying executive positions as something
which might be called a nonpartisan trustee. In Switzerland, for instance, the
representatives from the four main political parties who hold executive
positions pursuant to the Zauberformel, mentioned earlier, generally forsake
their partisan identity while in office. It is a conventional norm in Switzerland,
then, that "members of the Federal Council are expected on election to
renounce all formal ties to their parties and any interest groups."94 Things have
9z. See MICHAEL GALLAGHER, MICHAEL LAVER & PETER MAIR, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN
MODERN EUROPE 56 (3d ed. 2001).
93. See Lanny W. Martin & Georg Vanberg, Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and
Parliamentary Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. POL. ScI. 13, 14 (2004); see also id. at 13 ("Coalition
government ordinarily requires delegation of important policymaking powers to the
ministers who control different portfolios. In other words, a collection of actors (the
coalition partners, as represented in the cabinet) with preferences that diverge on at least
some issues must delegate power to individuals (the ministers) who are associated with a
particular party.").
94. Thomas A. Baylis, Collegial Leadership in Advanced Industrial Societies: The Relevance of the
Swiss Experience, 13 POLITY 33, 42 (198o).
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operated in a similar manner in the United States, where Republican American
Secretary of Defense William Cohen abandoned partisan politics when he
joined the cabinet of Democratic President Bill Clinton, and current Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates (appointed by President Bush and retained by
President Obama) is not a registered Republican in the first place. 9
While members of the Swiss cabinet do not represent examples of
government in opposition because they forsake their partisan identity, coalition
governments are not examples of pure government in opposition because
political leaders join the government in coalition governments by
compromising- even if not completely forsaking-their partisan identities.
Consider, for instance, the situation in parliamentary Israel after the last
national election in 2006.96 The party receiving the most votes was the Kadima
Party, led by incumbent Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, which received 29
seats out of 120 seats in the Israel Knesset 9 7 That meant that Prime Minister
Olmert needed to find other parties to join his coalition so that he could
achieve a working majority in the Israeli Knesset. Eventually, Olmert reached
an agreement with his chief opponents in the 2006 election, the Labour Party,
who received nineteen seats. 98 This meant that Labour Leaders Amir Peretz
and now (former Labour Prime Minister) Ehud Barak occupied the important
position of Defense Minister in the Kadima/Olmert Government.99
Barak, then, was both leader of the Labour Party and Defense Minister, and
this would seemingly involve a check on Olmert by a member of a losing
political coalition rather than by a member of a winning political coalition. But,
95. See Robert Gates, TIME, http://www.time.con/time/world/article/o,8599,1863939,oo.html
(last visited Sep. 29, 2009).
96. Israel enacted a law in 1992 that provided that the Prime Minister was to be elected directly
by the citizens, but that the Prime Minister could be removed by an absolute majority vote
of the Knesset. See Gideon Rahat, The Study of the Politics of Electoral Reform in the 199os:
Theoretical and Methodological Lessons, 36 COMP. POL. 461, 462 (2004). In 2003, it changed
the law back to give it a traditional parliamentary system, instead of a directly elected Prime
Minister. See id.
97. See Greg Myre, Premier-Elect in Israel Closer to a Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, at A8.
98. Id. Prime Minister Olmert also included within his coalition the Pensioners' Party (seven
seats), and the Shas Party (thirteen seats). See Jonathan Ferziger, Olmert Savvy
Keeps Coalition Intact as He Seeks Peace, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 16, 2oo8,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2o6ollo9&sid=atvaMmPk7ZtY&refer=home.
99. See Isabel Kershner, Ex-Premier of Israel Takes Helm of Labor Parry, N.Y. TIMEs, June 14,
2007, at A19. There are other recent and prominent examples of chief figures from the
political opposition occupying prominent positions in the cabinet of another party. In
Germany, Joshka Fischer, leader of the Green Party, was (Social Democratic) Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder's Foreign Minister during the time when Germany had to decide about
its policies toward American efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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by becoming Defense Minister as part of the Olmert coalition, Barak is not
exercising government in opposition power. Even though Barak maintains his
position as Labour Leader, he still sacrifices some of his opposition bona fides
by joining Olmert and his government, and in many ways acts at the behest of
Olmert and Kadima, since he is part of the Kadima Government. He was
obliged to support the Kadima Government of Olmert, or otherwise resign his
cabinet position -which Barak would be loath to do, given the importance of
his cabinet position and given the risks presented by being out of government.
3. Judicial Government in Opposition
Government in opposition rules also exist for courts and the judicial
branch. These judicial government in opposition rules extend not only to the
appointment of individuals to the courts in the first place, but also to the
operation of these courts. Some rules permit losing political coalitions the
power to appoint judges to the bench. Other rules permit judges appointed by
losing political coalitions the power to decide cases as majorities, or grant
losing political coalitions special powers to compel and command the resources
of the judicial branch.
About a dozen countries have adopted rules that guarantee members of
losing political coalitions the ability to appoint judges to courts. In Germany,
discussed briefly earlier, for instance, by informal agreement there is a "norm
of reciprocity that has established de facto party seats held by the three major
parties."' O A similar system exists in other countries, such as Portugal and
Spain.' The blue slip procedure in the United States Senate also creates a
system that permits senators from losing political coalitions informally to
nominate judges, although the President formally has to nominate them."2
loo. TOM GINSBURG, JUDIcIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTION COURTS IN ASIAN
CASES 45 (2003).
101. See Sofia Amaral Garcia, Nuno Garoupa & Veronica Grembi,Judicial Independence and Party
Politics in the Kelsenian Constituitonal Courts: The Case of Portugal 4-5 (Ill. L. & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. LE o8-021, 2008).
1o2. The blue slip procedure occurs when a senator from the potential or actual nominee's home
state objects to the nomination. See Brannon P. Denning, The "Blue Slip": Enforcing the
Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, lo WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 76 (2001). This
procedure can occur both before and after an actual nomination is submitted to the Senate.
See Memorandum from Senate Judiciary Comm. Staff to Senator Edward M. Kennedy,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 22, 1979), in Selection and Confirmation of Federal
Judges: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part I, 9 6th Cong. 131 (1979). If the blue
slip procedure is utilized after the nomination is submitted, and the home state senator
obstructs the nomination, we might see it more as the exercise of losers' powers. If it
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Losing political coalitions are not only sometimes given, informally, the
power to appoint judges, but also sometimes given special power to command
the resources of a court by being given standing to bring lawsuits through
generally applicable rules that permit losing groups to bring lawsuits. In the
United States, regardless of the winning or losing identity of a political figure
or group bringing a lawsuit, they still must prove that they have suffered some
sort of tangible, concrete harm.' °3 In several countries, losing political
coalitions are granted virtual automatic standing to challenge the
constitutionality of statutes. In Austria, for instance, there is no need for a
tangible harm to have occurred; one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate may file challenges against federal statutes, and
one-third may file challenges against state statutes.'0 4 The percentages go even
lower in some places; in Portugal, before the promulgation of a statute, one-
fifth of the members of the Assembly can bring a challenge,' and after
promulgation one-tenth of the members of the Assembly can." 6
Once lawsuits make their way into court, judges appointed by or affiliated
with losing political coalitions might sometimes not just be on the panel, but
might actually constitute the voting majority on the court for certain matters,
through rules that permit but do not encourage or mandate government in
opposition results. In the United States, since a single district court judge
usually decides a case at the federal district level, at some point in time that
federal district court judge will have been appointed by a party different from
the party in power, and indeed even a party different from the party that
dominates the federal bench at the time.' 7 At the federal appellate level, since
transpires before the nomination is submitted, and as part of the decision to nominate, it
seems more like the exercise of winners' powers by the home state senator (assuming, of
course, that the home state senator is not a member of the winning coalition).
103. The Supreme Court has interpreted Article III of the American Constitution to mean that
the plaintiff must demonstrate that there has been an "injury in fact," that this injury can be
traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and that a judicial decision will remedy this
injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56o (1992).
104. See Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBI No. 1/1930, as last amended by
Bundesgesetz [BG] BGB1 I No. 100/2003, art. 140, 1 (Austria). See generally Victor Ferreres
Comella, The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some
Thoughts on Judicial Activism, 82 TEx. L. REv. 1705 (2004) (discussing issues related to the
structure of constitutional courts).
105. Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG] [Constitution] BGBI No. 1/193o, as last amended by
Bundesgesetz [BG] BGBI I No. 100/2003, art. 278 (Austria).
1o6. Id. art. 281.
107. One notable example of this happened, for instance, when Judge Anna Diggs Taylor of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, appointed by President
119:548 2009
GOVERNMENT IN OPPOSITION
three judges have always decided cases -and since 1911, three judges from the
appellate court and not from the district court-there is the possibility that two
or three judges of the minority party could be deciding the case. °O
Of course, though, these accidental and random judicial government in
opposition panels are merely defaults, and can be overturned in various ways.
If a district court judge of one party issues a decision, it can be appealed to the
federal court of appeals, where a three-judge panel possibly consisting of
members of the majority party can overrule the decision. A decision by a three-
judge panel of the federal appellate court can be overturned by an en banc panel
of the whole court, which is much more likely to be composed by a majority of
majority party members. Finally, of course, these decisions can all be appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States.
III.THE NORMATIVE BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT IN OPPOSITION
RULES
As the previous Parts have discussed, government in opposition rules
represent a distinctive approach to structuring the separation of powers in
democratic systems. This Part will discuss the merits of government in
opposition rules, which are substantial. Government in opposition rules can
add much to all varieties of constitutional systems-from parliamentary to
semipresidential and presidential regimes-and to countries at all different
stages of maturity of their constitutional systems, from nascent, fragile
democracies to secure, established democracies. The most notable benefit of
government in opposition rules is that they provide the most effective-and
permanent-constraint on power of any separation of powers regime that
constitutions have ever contemplated. For all kinds of democracies, this means
there are limitations on how much power can be granted to a particular
political figure or political coalition. Government in opposition rules prevent
excesses of power, because even if a political movement wins all different kinds
of elections for all different kinds of positions, they still do not control all of the
winners powers.
But this logic of constraint and restraint on power is only part of what
government in opposition rules can offer constitutional democracies.
Permitting losing political coalitions to exercise the power to govern
Jimmy Carter, decided that President George W. Bush's wiretapping program was
unconstitutional. See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
1O8. See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS
OF APPEALS 234 (1994).
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encourages a broader range of perspectives to be aired in the political process,
and in a more meaningful way, ensuring a more robust version of
representative democracy. This role for losing political coalitions contributes to
both the stability and the legitimacy of the constitutional order; with many
voices being heard -and, more than that, many voices having their sentiments
become binding law-members of many different political movements
subscribe to some of the tenets of the democratic system. And, because of this
perceived legitimacy and because this legitimacy stems from experience
governing, more political movements are ready to lead if power switches
hands; more political movements have experience exercising (winners') power;
and, as a result, campaigns themselves become more substantive, changing the
nature of discourse in a democracy.
A. The Benefits of Government in Opposition Rules
1. The Constructive Winner: The Illiberal Democrat and Permanent
Constraint
As mentioned earlier, one of the key questions that constitutional designers
attempt to answer, as Bruce Ackerman has put it, is how many elections
political movements need to win before assuming "full authority."' 9 In
parliamentary systems, a political movement need only win one election before
assuming full authority. In presidential and semipresidential systems, a
political movement must succeed in several elections before assuming full
authority, and these several elections are for different forms of political office.
But all of these systems share the same feature: if a political movement is
successful enough, and convinces enough voters over a long enough period of
time, it can control all or almost all of the institutions exercising winners'
powers. There will be some slack, because there might still be winner-related
institutions or even purely bureaucratic institutions using winners' powers in
contravention of how the political movement wants. But, at the end of the day,
if the political movement is successful enough, it will achieve complete or at
least hegemonic control of the all-valuable winners' powers.
It might be the case that some political figures, even after achieving this
amount of control of winners' powers, would exercise this complete power in a
positive fashion. If this political movement in control of this amount of
winners' powers uses its electoral or political mandates to assume excessive
iog. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 648.
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power, though, that movement's leader has become an "illiberal democrat." 0
In such a situation, decisions are made without a full range of information and
perspectives being considered; so, for instance, after taking control of all
winners' powers, Prime Minister Blair supported the American efforts in Iraq
without considering the full range of concerns that other leaders-from the
Conservative party primarily- had been voicing. The rights of minorities were
suppressed by the American Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) after he had
taken control over all of the winners' powers available in the American federal
system (so, for instance, FDR ordered the internment of Japanese-Americans).
In a more fragile democracy like Russia, the menace of the illiberal democrat in
control of all winners' powers like Putin poses a threat to the very existence of
the democratic state, leading to a situation where major presidential candidates
were not permitted on the ballot (like chess star Garry Kasparov"..).
One system for preventing a hugely successful political coalition from
going to excess, mentioned earlier, is the idea of creating multiple winners,
each with control of their own institutions or parts of institutions, and thus
their own sets of winners' powers. The first problem with this arrangement is
that once a political movement becomes successful enough, any set of winners'
powers that can be captured by democratic elections will be captured by the
very successful political movement. A related problem arises as a result of the
strategy of trying to constrain the illiberal democrat and their complete control
of winners' powers by creating losers' powers. Simply put, the more powerful
the illiberal democrat becomes, the more that leader can cut back and ignore
losers' powers, because controlling all of the winners' powers means that the
winning political coalition has complete control over the "purse and the
sword""' that provide the hard power institutional support for the exercise of
losers' powers. Losing political coalitions, without a coercive set of winners'
powers behind them, do not have their own armies, their own courts, or their
own legislative committees to provide the muscle to support their losers'
powers and pose a real constraint on the exercise of winners' powers by an
unconstrained illiberal democrat.
11o. As mentioned before, I borrow this phrase and concept from Fareed Zakaria, among others.
See supra note 9.
iii. See Andrew E. Kramer, Kasparov Says He Was Forced To End Bid for Presidency, N.Y. TIMES
Dec. 13, 2007, at A18.
,2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 302 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) ("The executive not only dispenses the honours, but holds the sword
of the community; the legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated .... ").
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Another institutional strategy that has been used to attempt to constrain
the illiberal democrat is not to create more elections resulting in the greater
dispersion of winners' powers, but to immunize institutions exercising
winners' powers from the ambit of democratic oversight. This is, to some
degree, what constitutional courts were created to do, as James Madison
argued in The Federalist Papers."3 But even constitutional courts themselves are
creatures of democratic politics, since their judges are appointed by elected
figures, and so it is precisely a figure like an illiberal democrat who might try to
exert greater influence over courts. FDR's court-packing plan is a failed
example of this,114 but there are even better examples of successful efforts to
dominate courts through appointments from a political movement, such as
President Carlos Menem's efforts to control the Supreme Court in Argentina."'
Other institutions removed from the control of winning coalitions, such as civil
service-dominated bureaucratic institutions, might temporarily constrain
illiberal democrats, but even they can do only so much to constrain a hugely
successful political coalition -without the hard power and political base that
the illiberal democrat and his or her control of winners' powers has.
If all of the other institutional mechanisms of constraint fail to constrain
the electorally successful - but illiberal - democratic leader, then government in
opposition rules represent the best solution, because they always draw a line of
constraint beyond which the illiberal democrat cannot operate. No matter how
many elections the dominant political movement wins, and no matter how
much the dominant political movement comes to control winners' powers, it
does not exercise complete control over the entirety of winners' powers. In this
way, government in opposition prevents unconstrained winners from
overreaching, and from even overthrowing democratic systems entirely. Rather
than creating the possibility of winners' powers being controlled by several
113. See id. at 403. ("The complete independence of the courts ofjustice is peculiarly essential in a
limited constitution.").
114. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan,
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347.
11s. Menem succeeded where FDR failed and enlarged the size of the Supreme Court of
Argentina from five to nine Justices - and when one remaining Justice resigned, he was able
to appoint a majority of members of the Court. See HORAcIo VERBITSKY, HACER LA CORTE:
LA CONSTRUCCION DE UN PODER ABSOLUTO SIN JUSTICIA NI CONTROL 67 (1993). This was
not the first time that the government of Argentina had decided to alter significantly the
composition of the Court. See Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-
Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 291,
292 (2002) ("[T]he Court was replaced en masse by the military following the coup in 1976
and again by the incoming democratic government of Raul Alfonsin in 1983.").
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different coalitions, at least some forms of government in opposition rules
(mandatory rules) make this a requirement.
Government in opposition rules constrain the excess of the illiberal
democrat in two ways. First, being in the minority when it comes to some
decisions might especially sensitize majorities to the concerns of minorities. " 6
We can call this rationale for government in opposition rules the "responsible
winner" rationale."17 In other words, government in opposition rules foster
more responsive and responsible winning coalitions, and this is one way such
rules remedy the problem of the unconstrained winner. The illiberal democrat
will have incentives not to overstep, because even the illiberal democrat will
have to be in the minority on occasion, and will want to be treated fairly.
In the context of government in opposition rules, imagine, for instance, if,
while he was still in power, President Vladimir Putin of Russia was forced to
deal with a Foreign Minister Garry Kasparov, from a leading opposition party.
That would mean that Foreign Minister Kasparov would be making key
foreign policy decisions. President Putin would have had to be careful about
how dismissive he was of Kasparov's United Civil Front political party, because
even though President Putin could formally overrule Kasparov's activities as
Foreign Minister, Kasparov would most of the time be making final foreign
policy decisions, and no matter what, it would be difficult and politically costly
for Putin to constantly overrule Kasparov's decisions.
The responsible winner scenario envisions that, because of the winning
coalitions' powers exercised by losing coalitions, winning coalitions will act
more responsibly so that losing coalitions use their winners' powers more
responsibly as well. In other words, it assumes a certain longitudinal
consciousness and assessment of interests on the parts of winners-knowing
that they control most winners' powers, but aware that if they use those
powers equitably, at some hypothetical point down the line losing coalitions
might also use their (fewer) winners' powers more responsibly. But there will
be many situations in which political coalitions might not keep this reciprocity
concern in mind, and so might act to excess. This might be even truer in the
116. See Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 2, at 1146 (noting how "second-order
diversity" might have this characteristic).
117. The "responsible winner" rationale for government in opposition rules is similar to the
situations that Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule discussed when the President of the United
States wants to indicate that he or she has the best of intentions. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CH. L. REV. 865, 867 (2007) ("[T]he [executive]
credibility dilemma can be addressed by executive signaling. Without any new
constitutional amendments, statutes, or legislative action, law and executive practice already
contain resources to allow a well-motivated executive to send a credible signal of his
motivations, committing to use increased discretion in public-spirited ways.").
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case of the illiberal democrat, a political figure who has achieved such electoral
success that constraints on power might be fewer and farther between, and his
assumptions about the scope of his power might be exaggerated. In this
situation, government in opposition rules do not dissuade the illiberal
democrat from acting to excess because of an enlightened, longitudinal sense of
self-interest, but rather because these rules directly block the illiberal democrat
from acting to excess when the illiberal democrat affirmatively and aggressively
tries to act to excess. In these situations, rather than relying on the restraint of
winning coalitions, government in opposition rules constrain by relying on the
affirmative actions of losing coalitions blocking the actions of winning
coalitions.
Of course, there is instability, or what Adrian Vermeule has called
"reversibility"" 8 problems with this situation -meaning that, since the illiberal
democrat is the political majority, with some extra effort he can always
overturn this exercise of winners' powers by the losing political coalition. But
the public will become accustomed to the status quo created by the exercise of
winners' powers by losing political coalitions.119 Some exercises of winners'
powers by losing coalitions, such as those releasing damaging information to
the public, are irreversible.'2 ° Simply by holding hearings and releasing
documentary information into the public domain that sensationalized the
British body politic, 2 ' MP Leigh and his Public Accounts Committee had done
damage to the Blair Government that it could not undo, regardless of what
committee it assigned its deportation bill to or what chair it might have
replaced to appoint Leigh on the Public Accounts Committee. Norms might
also develop that it is unfair to overrule the exercise of winners' powers by
losing coalitions.'22 So, when losing coalitions use winners' powers to block
winning coalitions, it is not perfectly stable, but it is largely stable.
118. See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 89 ("[S]ubmajoritarian decisions are exposed to reversal by
subsequent majorities, and might thus be chronically unstable.").
11g. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228-
29 (2003) ("[I]ndividuals tend to prefer the present state of the world to alternative states,
all other things being equal.").
12o. Adrian Vermeule makes this point about transparency decisions that can be made by
submajorities. See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 91 ("Once published, perhaps by a
submajoritarian decision, the information circulates beyond the power of subsequent
majorities to suppress, whether or not they possess legal authority to do so.").
121. See MP Dubs Home Office 'Incompetent,' supra note 67.
122. For a good example of this, consider how a majority of five on the U.S. Supreme Court
hardly ever votes to reject a petition that the Rule of Four permits four Justices on the Court




One of the normative points of this Section-that government in
opposition rules are normatively desirable because they constrain illiberal
democrats better than other mechanisms of constraint -relates to a descriptive
and explanatory point that I am working on in other projects. One of the main
reasons why these rules were created in the first place was because of a
particular historical dynamic where political figures feared they might be in the
minority and were looking for rules to constrain those in the majority. MP
Edward Short, the aforementioned Member of Parliament responsible for
creating systematic government in opposition in Great Britain, proposed his
system because "no other system will prevent a Prime Minister from going too
far better than this."' 3 Short believed that government in opposition rules were
better, if not at least as good, at protecting losing political coalitions as judicial
review.
Given these explanations for the constraining role of government in
opposition rules -and the fact that Short and others relied on these reasons in
proposing these rules -it should not be surprising that several large-N studies
have demonstrated that power-sharing regimes actually do promote regime
stability in a range of countries because of the manner in which they restrain
illiberal democrats.' 4 There is good reason to believe that power-sharing
regimes limited to government in opposition rules, though, in particular promote
stability. For instance, the idea of the mutual veto, also included in Lijphart's
definition of consociationalism,' s has created antagonism between rival
political and other factions in many countries and created excessive stalemate.
Government in opposition rules give losing political coalitions some winners'
powers, but, ultimately, the winning political coalition can push an initiative
through if it so desires. The mutual veto, by contrast, essentially gives winning
and losing political coalition joint winners' powers related to major issues,26
and therefore the mutual veto makes it almost impossible for the winning
coalition to push through actions unless it changes the existing constitutional
order. For instance, the presence of mutual vetoes, utilized related to important
matters by both Turkish and Greek groups to cause paralysis and stalemate, is
123. See 312 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5 th ser.) (1964) 831-32.
124. See Pippa Norris, Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict,
Electoral Systems, and Democratization, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY:
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 206 (Andrew
Reynolds ed., 2002).
125. See LIJPHART, supra note 40, at 25.
126. These joint winners' powers apply to particularly controversial areas of policy, such as
foreign affairs and security policies. See H. IBRAHIM SALIH, CYPRUS: ETHNIC POLITICAL
COUNTERPOINTS 3 (2004)..
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what ultimately destroyed the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus and its government
in opposition- but also mutual veto- rules.'27
Power-sharing regimes, in general, have simply worked much better when
there was integration and not segregation. Government in opposition rules, on
their own, do not give losing political coalitions fiefdoms where they can hide
from winning political coalitions. But a mutual veto and segmental autonomy
create precisely that situation, and give significant winners' powers to
individuals and groups simply by their ability to join a group and not integrate
with other coalitions. It is not surprising, then, that some studies show
government in opposition rules joined together with politically and culturally
isolationist devices like mutual vetoes have intensified political cleavages.12 8
Nor is it surprising that systems that have integrated groups by using
government in opposition rules, but not segregated them in other ways, have
worked better. 9
Likewise, another one of the modalities of power-sharing that Lijphart has
grouped under the rubric of power-sharing regimes is the idea of segmental
autonomy, which means that political minorities
rule ... in the area of the minority's exclusive concern. While matters
of mutual concern are to be resolved by joint agreement reached
through the mechanisms of coalition, veto and proportionality, matters
of particular concern are to be resolved by delegating authority to the
individual segments. In this way, segmental autonomy removes
sensitive and potentially destabilizing issues from the larger political
arena.'
30
127. See Philippos K. Savvides, Cyprus: The Dynamics of Partition 23-25 (Feb 9, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/
kokkalis/GSW2/Savvides.PDF.
128. For two studies making this point about power-sharing regimes in Northern Ireland, see
Joanne Hughes & Caitlin Donnelly, Community Relations in Northern Ireland: A Shift in
Attitudes?, 29 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 643 (2003); and James Tilley, Geoffrey Evans &
Claire Mitchell, Consociationalism and the Evolution of Political Cleavages in Northern Ireland,
1989-2004, 38 BRIT. J. POL. SCd. 699, 704 (2008).
129. See Robert H. Dix, Consociational Democracy: The Case of Colombia, 12 COMP. POL. 303, 311
(198o) ("In most communities of any size, there tends to be a mix of Liberals and
Conservatives, and partisan allegiances do not prevent regular interaction. Such interaction
is especially notable at the elite level, where most elite clubs and interest associations are
either by inadvertence or by design bipartisan in nature.") (internal citations omitted).
13o. Edmund A. Aunger, Dispersed Minorities and Segmental Autonomy: French-Language School
Boards in Canada, 2 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POL. 191, 191 (1996).
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But segmental autonomy creates precisely the same problems as mutual
vetoes: by separating out power and creating separate enclaves for its exercise,
there is again the potential for more conflict and stalemate. For these reasons,
while power-sharing regimes make sense, limiting these regimes to
government in opposition rules in particular makes sense.
2. The Constructive Loser: Legitimacy and Readiness
The previous Subsection discussed how government in opposition rules
create more constrained-and hence more constructive -winning political
coalitions, particularly when these winning political coalitions become
massively successful in winning elections of all kinds at all levels. But
government in opposition rules also have normative benefits because they
result in a more attractive role for losing political coalitions. Government in
opposition rules expand the genre of formal powers granted to losing political
coalitions by also providing them with winners' powers. Granting these
additional powers to losing political coalitions, though, does much more than
add to their formal repertoire of powers; it completely reconceives what losing
political parties do, and for the best.
First, government in opposition rules compensate for the increasing
tendency in democratic countries to provide winning political coalitions with
so much power that losing political coalitions are nearly powerless. It has long
been true, as John Stuart Mill wrote, that it is an "essential part of democracy
that minorities should be adequately represented. . . . [and that n]o real
democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it."''
One means of doing this is to solidify the place of losing political coalitions qua
losing political coalitions. In democratic systems without proportional
representation, losing political coalitions are represented in democratic
institutions, but not as many political parties are represented as in countries
with proportional representation.'32 Regimes like proportional representation
ensure that losing political coalitions are even more represented in political
institutions; protecting losers' powers like the right to dissent ensures that
these political coalitions can undertake certain activities as part of their
representation of losing political coalitions.
131. JOHN STUART MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 157 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1869).
132. For instance, in the United States House of Representatives, two political parties are
represented, the Democratic and Republican Parties, while in the Indian Lok Sabha, thirty-
nine political parties are represented. See GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING 58-59 (2d ed. 1997).
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In this way, then, traditional structures of constitutional democracy ensure
that losing political coalitions are represented, in the more formal sense that
losing political coalitions occupy elected positions and have at least some
(albeit losers') powers that come along with these elected positions. But even
though losing political coalitions are represented because they have a seat at the
political table, their power is minimal-and not just because, without
government in opposition rules, they only exercise losers' powers. The nature
of winners exercising winners' powers has meant that losing political
coalitions, in many democracies, are increasingly left with fewer and fewer
opportunities for relevance. Losing political coalitions have a seat at the
political table, but at best all they can do is listen to the discussion transpiring
at that table.
In parliamentary regimes, for instance, it is virtually impossible for
members of losing political coalitions -even though they are full members of
legislative bodies -to propose pieces of legislation, and nearly impossible to
have their proposed legislation enacted. The rules of parliamentary bodies
ensure this. For example, legislation proposed by the winning political
coalition in the House of Commons has a ninety-seven percent chance of being
enacted; legislation proposed by losing political coalitions has a small chance of
even being considered, and almost zero chance of being enacted. 33 This
dynamic is not limited to Great Britain. In almost all parliamentary
democracies, losing political coalitions have their initiatives debated and
enacted a small percentage of the time. 34 In presidential or semipresidential
democracies, the same is true. 3' The sum total means "that in more than 5o
percent of all [democratic] countries, governments introduce [and enact] more
than 90 percent of the bills. '36
In other words, government in opposition rules ensure a more robust
version of representation in politics, and hence a more robust version of
legitimacy for democratic institutions. Advances in institutional rules like
proportional representation have created more ways for losing political
coalitions to remain somewhat relevant, but they remain largely marginalized.
A political coalition losing the parliamentary election in Germany by one vote,
133. See Richard Rose, British MPs: More Bark than Bite?, in PARLIAMENTS AND
PARLIAMENTARIANS IN DEMOcRATIc POLITIcs 8, 11 (Ezra N. Suleiman ed., 1986).
134. See VALENTINE HERMAN, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, PARLIAMENTS OF THE WORLD: A
REFERENCE COMPENDIUM 630-37 (1976).
135. See Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo & Fernando Limongi, Presidential Power, Legislative
Organization, and Parry Behavior in Brazil, 32 COMP. POL. 151, 154-55 (2000).
136. See George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,
Parliatentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyisni, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289,304 (1995).
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for instance, would have close to a zero percent chance of having its legislation
enacted, while the political coalition that received one vote more would have
close to a one hundred percent chance of its legislation being enacted.
Government in opposition rules modify this reality by ensuring greater (actual
winners') powers for losing political coalitions.
Indeed, government in opposition rules might be more than a welcome
addition to the normative representational benefits that proportional
representation regimes provide; they might be valuable replacements for
proportional representation rules. Proportional representation rules have clear
tendencies to foster gridlock and instability because there are so many parties
exercising losers' powers and obstructing governance, 37 and also because they
permit "the inclusion of extreme candidates"'13s who do not have to receive as
many votes as they would without such rules in order to hold a seat in the
legislature and can challenge the very nature of the constitutional regime.
Government in opposition rules, depending on their precise design, 39 do
permit a range of interests to be represented in government, but by giving
these interests winners' powers as well as losers' powers, they change the
incentives for gridlock and for extremism. Because those being represented
through the exercise of government in opposition powers can be blamed for
the gridlock in government, and have much to lose from the fall of
137. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman Is
Wrong To Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 59-66 (2001);
see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997) ("The
Constitution permits the Minnesota Legislature to decide that political stability is best
served through a healthy two-party system.").
138. See Issacharoff, supra note 8, at 1419.
139. It can be the case that there could be a high burden to meet to qualify to exercise
government in opposition powers, such as the rule under the interim constitution of South
Africa that a party had to receive at least twenty percent of the vote in order to be granted an
executive deputy president position. See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 84(t) ("Every
party holding at least 80 seats in the National Assembly shall be entitled to designate an
Executive Deputy President from among the members of the National Assembly."). The
1998 settlement in Northern Ireland also featured some significant barriers that had to be
satisfied before political parties could exercise government in opposition powers. See
Brendan O'Leary, Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments, in
FROM POWER SHARING TO DEMOCRACY: POST-CONFLICT INSTITUTIONS IN ETHNICALLY
DIVIDED SOCIETIES 3, 14-15 (Sid Noel ed., 2005). These rules can be seen as the analogues to
the aforementioned rules in some proportional representation systems that require that
political parties receive a certain minimum percentage of the vote before they qualify for
seats in the legislature. The contrast, of course, is that some government in opposition rules
permit virtually any political coalition, no matter how few votes they received, to exercise
government in opposition powers -think of the rules governing Short Money in the British
Parliament.
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government, there are fewer reasons to believe that government in opposition
rules will cause the problems that proportional representation rules cause,
140
particularly in presidential systems.
14'
Not only is there reason to believe that government in opposition rules
make constitutional systems more normatively desirable because they ensure
that losing political coalitions occupy more than a hollow seat at the table, but
this broader and more robust approach to political representation also leads to
a more stable constitutional system. Constitutional democracies with
government in opposition rules will be more stable because even losing
political coalitions have a stake in the basic functionality of the regime. If the
regime is not working, losing political coalitions can be at least partly to blame,
and so will suffer political costs; and if the regime is not working, losing
political coalitions might be willing to take the chance on new or subsequent
elections (which might result in some continued winners' powers if they are in
opposition, but more winners' powers if they triumph in the election), but not
on an entirely new constitutional system (because that new system might
feature dramatically fewer powers for whoever loses elections).
The role of government in opposition rules does create actual as opposed to
just theoretical "sociological legitimacy,' 142 which should not be surprising
given the general dynamics of public support for government. When citizens
believe a political figure with similar positions and politics to their own is not
just representing them in government but actually exercising winners' powers,
their core support for the constitutional system increases. In the United States
those associated with the Democratic Party are more likely to support the
140. In Italy, for instance, between 1945 and 1996 the Italian Cabinet lasted an average of 1.28
years before being replaced by a new coalition of parties. See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF
DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COuNTRIEs 132 tbl. 7 .1
(1999). But, as Bruce Ackerman has stated, many of the problems posed by proportional
representation rules can be mitigated, if not eliminated, by "the necessary bits of
constitutional engineering." Ackerman, supra note 5, at 654.
141. See Robert A. Dahl, Thinking About Democratic Constitutions: Conclusions from Democratic
Experience, in POLITICAL ORDER: NoMos XXXVIII, 175, 192 (Ian Shapiro & Russell Hardin
eds., 1996) ("of all the major alternatives, presidentialism with PR-the Latin American
option- may be the most unstable.") (emphasis omitted).
142. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795
(2005) ("When legitimacy is measured in sociological terms, a constitutional regime,
governmental institution, or official decision possesses legitimacy in a strong sense insofar
as the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support




government if the president is a Democrat. 43 Likewise, political support is
highest in multiparty, proportional representation systems, because there are
the most positions and opportunities for one's political party to win an election
and hold the resultant winners' powers. As a recent article explained it:
[I]nstitutional mechanisms such as the electoral system and the
number of parties . . . make losers less distrusting of government in
proportional democracies. . . . [P]roportional democracies are
associated not only to electoral rules and coalition and minority
governments but also to committee parliamentary rules that facilitate
the influence of the opposition in the policy-making process. This
implies that even those citizens not ideologically close to any party of
the coalition government have the capacity to influence the legislative
process. Under such circumstances, a citizen ideologically far from the
government coalition will probably consider that the government is
unable to harm his or her interests and therefore [it] is less probable
that he or she distrusts the government."'
Indeed, most of the information we have suggests the kind of support for
government that increases when one's party exercises winners' powers is an
increase in diffuse support, or support for the basic structural legitimacy of a
constitutional system.145 This means that government in opposition rules are
particularly important for more fragile democracies, where an emphasis on
stability might be warranted. But it also means that at least some parts or some
amount of these rules might be warranted for more stable democracies, because
even stable democracies should create institutions that promote their basic
stability. Even beyond the basic support for the core of the constitutional
system, other positive elements will be on the rise with this increased support
for the system that comes with government in opposition rules -turnout and
143. See John R. Alford, We're All in this Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958-1966,
in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 28 (John R. Hibbing &
Elizabeth Theiss-Moore eds., 2001); Jack Citrin & Samantha Luks, Political Trust Revisited:
Dji Vu All Over Again?, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE?,
supra, at 9.
144. See Henar Criado & Francisco Herreros, Political Support: Taking into Account the Institutional
Context, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 1511, 1516 (2007).
145. See DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965) (describing diffuse
support as a "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or
tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to
their wants").
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involvement in the political system is higher in parts of the United States, 146 for
instance, that feature more parties and more viewpoints included among those
exercising winners' powers.
Another question about how constructive of a role losing political coalitions
can play in systems with government in opposition rules is what will happen to
the more ideologically extreme members of the winning coalition. Some will
join government, exercise winners' powers, and be happy with that. Others
will continue their ideological efforts, believing these efforts best waged from
outside government. But this fact-that members of the losing political
coalition do not need to join the government to be relevant -is why many of
the criticisms of Donald Horowitz about whether rules like government in
opposition rules promote stability are misplaced. 147 There still is opposition to
the government, coming primarily from the exercise of winners' powers by
losing coalitions.
Another reason why losing political coalitions play a more constructive role
in systems with government in opposition rules is that they help better prepare
a range of political and bureaucratic officials to exercise winners' powers and to
govern. Major elected political figures - and their political assistants and the
technical bureaucratic officials associated with them-will have experience
actually running a cabinet agency, a committee, or a court, regardless of which
political party they identify with and whether that political party is a part of the
winning or the losing political coalition. Tony Blair, as leader of the Labour
Party when the Labour Party was in opposition, gained knowledge about how
Parliament works by managing the seventeen days a year when his party
controlled the operations of the House of Commons. 148 His assistants in the
Labour Party then learned about the operations of the various cabinet
ministries, and several of his deputies actually operated these cabinet ministries
for several days a year, as mentioned earlier. 149
146. See Shaun Bowler, David Brockington & Todd Donovan, Election Systems and Voter Turnout:
Experiments in the United States, 63 J. POL. 902 (2001).
147. Donald Horowitz says that "(t]he grand coalition implies that the model of government and
opposition is rejected. Consensual democracy replaces majoritarian democracy, and
opposition is necessarily located inside government." Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory
Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213,
1216 (2008).
148. See AUTH. OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, STANDING ORDER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 15
(2007), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2oo7o8/cmstords/io5/
1o5.pdf.
149. See Johnson, supra note 65, at 493-96.
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The benefits of this experience are obvious. First, in the unlikely and
unfortunate event of a terrorist attack or any other need to quickly reestablish
the government, there would be a larger and broader group of trained
professionals to take control.' Second, transitions between governments
would not be so abrupt and inefficient. If the government needed to tackle an
urgent issue -such as the financial crisis of 2007-2009, or a dangerous war or
foreign policy crisis-there would not be as much difficulty in shifting from
one elected government to another. This is because there would already be a
ready supply of functionaries of the previously losing-and now winning-
political coalition ready to take power from day one. Indeed, it is the fact that
there are so many government in opposition rules in places like Great Britain
that permit, right after an election, "a new prime minister [to] replace[] a
defeated incumbent the very next day." '
Finally, although this requires further empirical examination and
elaboration, giving leaders of the losing political coalition actual experience
using winners' powers contributes to more substantive and less personal
political campaigns. When political figures have a record in government, that
record becomes the subject of political debate and discussion.
B. Concerns about Government in Opposition Rules
i. The Stalemate Tradeof?.
If government in opposition rules are normatively desirable because, in
part, they constrain excessive uses of power, they do potentially pose a problem
based on the flip side of the constraint coin: these rules may constrain
government too much-and therefore constitutional designers must find the
proper balance. Excessive constraint can be problematic from a policy and from
a stability perspective. In both stable and fragile democracies, it might prevent
important policies from being enacted. In more fragile democracies, the
possibility of gridlock, stalemate, and inaction can threaten the basic
iso. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble with Shadow Government, 52 EMORY L.J. 281,
281 (2003) ("Presidential succession and government continuity suddenly is a hot topic. The
September ii terrorist attacks and the subsequent War Against Terrorism have brought to
the fore the possibility of a catastrophic terrorist attack . . . killing the president and vice
president, and destroying Congress and the federal government. This prospect in turn raises
. . . questions about how to preserve the federal government . . . how to maintain
governance in the federal system . . . who will . . . assume the executive power under the
Constitution and how to repopulate the political branches.").
151. Sanford Levinson, How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic Deficit in
America, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 859, 871 (2007).
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constitutional order. An effective constitutional system will constrain excessive
power, but will not prevent useful exercises of power. In other words, might
government in opposition rules constrain too much and empower too little?
There are several responses to this concern. First, the number and
importance of government in opposition rules can be adjusted, depending on
the country and the situation. Constitutional systems can vary the degree to
which they can be characterized as government in opposition systems. This
might mean that government in opposition rules are warranted for systems
where the concern is with government doing too much, and not too well, and
where the concern is with an illiberal democrat rather than an already
constrained winner. In drafting the Interim Constitution of South Africa, there
were many government in opposition rules, because the constitution was
created to manage the transition to democracy. In the final Constitution of
South Africa, there are no obvious government in opposition rules; this is
because South Africa survived the years when democracy was more at risk of
being destabilized, and so the need for these rules has dissipated or
disappeared." 2 In stable democracies, like the United States-as will be
discussed in Part IV-it might make sense to adjust downward the number of
government in opposition rules when there is divided government, because
then there are already plenty of checks on power, while when there is unified
government there will be fewer constraints on power.
Another manner to adjust government in opposition rules to ensure there is
not excessive constraint is to limit the number of political coalitions that can
utilize government in opposition rules. The Interim South African
Constitution only guaranteed Executive Deputy President positions to political
coalitions receiving twenty percent of the vote.'53 In Britain, political parties
receive funding as opposition parties only if they have elected at least two
members to Parliament in the preceding general election, or have elected at
least one member and received at least 150,000 popular votes overall.' 4 Just as
some countries have minimum vote requirements to ensure that there are not
too many parties represented in the legislature and causing chaos, so too might
it make sense to limit the number of parties that can benefit from government
in opposition rules.
1S2. See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOB3ALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S
POLTIcAL RECONSTRUCTION 151-55 (2000).
153. See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 art. 84(1) ("Every party holding at least 8o seats in the
National Assembly shall be entitled to designate an Executive Deputy President from among
the members of the National Assembly.").




In other words, then, government in opposition rules need not be excessive
sources of constraint because they can be altered or modified. And because
government in opposition rules are, by definition, rules empowering political
minorities, they can be changed by the actions of political majorities acting
within the established rules of the constitutional system, without even
repealing the government in opposition rule in the first place. If the winning
coalition does not like what the losing political coalition did with its winners'
powers, it can simply redirect a regulation or legislation to ensure that it is
controlled by the winning coalition. Depending on the legal form that the
government in opposition rules take, this repeal by simple majority can be
done with more or less effort. If the government in opposition rule results from
an informal understanding, then the majority can decide simply to ignore this
informal understanding if it feels that this informal understanding is overly
constraining. For example, Blair decided to do away with the informal
understanding that led to two days of Prime Minister's Question Time, and
minority-dominated legislative time, and condensed it into one day of
minority-dominated Prime Minister's Qjuestion Time.
All of this, of course, is assuming that government in opposition rules
stagnate energetic government in the first place, which is an empirically
debatable assumption, similar to the debate in the political science literature
about whether divided or unified governments produce more significant
policies."' 5 While it might be surprising that major initiatives are enacted in
regimes with major government in opposition powers, the political dynamics
of such systems make it less surprising that major legislation is enacted. Voters
blame any party exercising winners' powers, even if that party is part of the
losing coalition exercising fewer winners' powers, and so parties that are part
of losing coalitions do have an interest in ensuring that government
accomplishes something of significance.
G.B. Powell has found that proportional representation and other similar
tools contribute to obscure responsibility in voter evaluations of governmental
performance, and so voters are more willing to blame all parties rather than
some political parties because all parties are seen as being part of
15S. David Mayhew, in a book that has attracted substantial agreement and disagreement, has
argued that divided government does not decrease the enactment of major legislation. See
DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-199o, at 178 (1991). For agreement with his findings, see Sarah A.
Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519 (1999). Even
after a wave of criticisms, there is at least some consensus that Mayhew's core finding has
been empirically validated. See MORRIS FIORINA, DIVIDED GovERNMENT 162-66 (2d ed.
1996).
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government.' st Indeed, in parliamentary systems, the more complex the
coalition constituting the government, the less able voters are to blame
particular political parties and not others, and so the more they blame all
political parties.5 7 In other words, then, because they exercise at least some
winners' powers, losing political coalitions will be held responsible for the
failures of government-and so do not have an interest in obstructing
government to such an extent that it causes the stalemate-driven nightmare of
the impotent government. Not only do losing political coalitions have a greater
interest in avoiding excessive gridlock in government in opposition systems
because they will be held at least partly responsible for the failures of the
government, but also because the destruction of such systems poses the threat
of the losing political coalitions losing the winners' powers that they do have.
2. Sowing the Seeds of Destruction: The Weimar Problem
In countries with political parties that do not believe in the fundamental
tenets of the democratic system, government in opposition rules might
empower those parties by giving them winners' powers. A party that believes
in the destruction of the government, rather than being forced to operate only
with losers' powers, would instead be given winners' powers and a better
ability to overthrow the government. As mentioned before, this is part of the
structural explanation of how Adolf Hitler destroyed the constitution of
Weimar Germany. Hitler's Nazi Party, when still a minority party (but a part
of the majority coalition), used the powers granted to several ministries to
eliminate opposition and eventually repeal the entire Weimar Constitution
itself. '8
156. See G. BINGHAM POWELL JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN
AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS (2000). Others have helpfully elaborated on this argument:
First, in majoritarian systems, where governments have a majority in the
parliament, power is concentrated and the outcomes are easily attributed to the
incumbent. In proportional systems, power is dispersed among government,
opposition parties, and a range of other political institutions, and the outcomes of
policies are more difficult to attribute .... The second mechanism claims that in
proportional democracies, where power is more dispersed among different
political groups, the support for institutions by those citizens who are not
ideologically identified with the incumbent will be higher than in majoritarian
democracies.
Criado & Herreros, supra note 14-4, at 1516-17.
157. See MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK, ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS: THE MAJOR WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES 108-o9 (1988).
1SS. A.J. NICHOLS, WEIMARAND THE RISE OF HITLER 164, 168-69 (4th ed. 2000).
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We might worry less about these destabilizing parties and this "Weimar
Problem" in stable democracies. In the United States, antisystem parties never
posed much of a threat to the constitutional order, and so when we discuss
government in opposition rules we are really discussing the division of power
between the Democratic and Republican parties, neither of which promises to
overthrow the American Constitution. In stable democracies, we can talk about
the "loyal" opposition.5 9 In many other stable democracies, there are more
fringe parties than in the United States-perhaps because of proportional
representation -but even these fringe parties generally tend not to support
goals at odds with the fundamental tenets of the democratic system.16 ° Parties
that might be seen as ideologically extreme are still sympathetic enough to the
basic goals of democratic systems that they can be incorporated into governing
coalitions. On the right, the Italian National Alliance and the Dutch Pim
Fortuyn List have joined winning coalitions; on the left, the German Green
Party has joined the coalition government of the Social Democrats."'
This, therefore, is more a concern about fragile democracies, and whether
government in opposition rules undermine the core stability of these new
democracies. If government in opposition rules do actually present the
possibility of creating the "Weimar Problem," there are institutional design
responses. One common institutional design response to this problem of
political parties abusing government in opposition rules in order to overthrow
governments is simply to prevent such political parties from operating in the
first place. This so-called "militant democracy" approach-which is used in
many countries and was discussed very recently by Samuel Issacharoff in his
Harvard Law Review article on the subject162-prevents political parties from
operating if they do not believe in certain basic tenets of the democratic system.
This conditions approach is used in the government in opposition context
as well. In Britain, the money allocated to support the activities of opposition
parties requires the taking of an oath, which states as follows: "I ... swear by
Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty





159. See MARY DURKIN & OONAGH GAY, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, HER MAJESTY'S
OPPOSITION, SN/PC/391o, at 2 (Feb. 8, 20o6).
16o. See Peter Mair, The Challenge to Party Government, 31 W. EUR. POL. 211, 212-13 (2008).
161. Id.
162. See Issacharoff, supra note 8.
163. See CHRIS SEAR, PARLIAMENT & CONSTITUTION CTR, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, THE
PARLIAMENTARY OATH, (Research Paper Ol/116, 2001), available at http://
www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp200/rpo l-i16.pdf.
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Rather than just being a meaningless formality, this technique of
constraining what sorts of parties could be seated (and therefore could receive
Short Money) has been controversial over the years. The Irish nationalist party
Sinn Fein has often elected members of Parliament, but its members of
Parliament have refused to take this oath, and therefore have never received
Short Money. 16' The House of Commons has appropriated special monies to
fund opposition parties, like Sinn Fein, who do not take this oath but who
would otherwise be entitled to funding. 6' This response to the problem
presented by disloyal parties, of course, would present obvious constitutional
problems for countries-like the United States-that have strong free speech
protections.
But it is also possible that government in opposition rules will not increase
the chances of the "Weimar Problem" transpiring. By including members of
these destabilizing parties in the government and in the exercise of winners'
powers, government in opposition rules might actually moderate them. These
destabilizing parties, once in power, might not want to give up the part of the
total amount of winners' powers they have and risk having fewer winners'
powers in an entirely new constitutional regime. Political parties desire power,
and often will moderate to obtain and maintain this power.' 66 In Northern
Ireland, for instance, the government in opposition rules of the Sunningdale
experiment induced destabilizing political figures to work with moderates in
the government. 67 It is true, though, that there will be times when a political
party will make the assessment that it is better to decline any winners' powers,
in the belief that it can destroy the constitutional system enough to possess
more winners' powers in another constitutional regime. This was the case in
Colombia in the middle of the twentieth century, when the Liberal and
Conservative governments alternated criticizing each other when the other was
in power, always believing that they could cause the government-and the
constitution-to collapse and then create a more favorable new constitution.
68
But rare will be the situation when any political party, whatever its political
beliefs, decides to opt for losers' powers over winners' powers. And when an
164. Id. at 3.
165. See KELLY, supra note 154, app. 5, at 19.
166. See Donald L. Horowitz, Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict
Management, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 451, 451-75 (Joseph
V. Montville ed., 1991).
167. See PEACE AT LAST? THE IMPACT OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND
(Jorg Neuheiser & Stefan Wolff eds., 2002).




antisystem party does make the calculation that holding losers' powers is a
preferable choice to holding winners' powers because the constitutional order
is likely to soon be overturned, there might not be much that institutional rules
can do anyway.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR THE AMERICAN SCENE
The last Part discussed how government in opposition rules could benefit
all constitutional systems, stable and fragile, presidential, semipresidential, or
parliamentary. This Part will focus in greater detail on some of the benefits
from government in opposition rules for one particular constitutional system,
the current American constitutional system. This Part is not meant to be an
exhaustive, complete examination of the ways in which government in
opposition rules would benefit the current American separation of powers
regime. Certainly, some of the questions of the desirability and
constitutionality of such a system require their own separate article. Therefore,
this Part is a general sketch of some of the main virtues - and issues - related to
incorporating some of the main structural components of government in
opposition rules elsewhere into the American system.
As this Part will discuss, several problems have emerged that could be at
least partially remedied by creating a more elaborate and consequential series of
American government in opposition rules. The United States, of course, does
already have some government in opposition rules. The Seven Member Rule,
mentioned earlier, permits minorities on certain committees in Congress to
compel information from the executive branch. Part III also mentioned the
possibility of federal judges appointed by parties then not part of the electoral
majority making decisions at a time when the party that appointed them was
no longer in power. This Part will discuss how expanding the number and
prominence of rules such as these would have many positive effects for the
current American constitutional regime. It argues that, only during times of
unified government (when one party controls all winners' powers) a series of
statutory or constitutional provisions should require that members of the
political party out of power negotiate with the winning political party. The
result must be, at minimum, some significant (if perhaps not precisely
specified) number of important cabinet positions, chairmanships of important
congressional committees, and the ability to nominate a certain number of
federal judges to be controlled by the leadership of the losing political coalition.
The increasingly partisan nature of current American politics calls for an
increasingly partisan constraint on the operation of government. When
political parties were more fragmented, or political figures voted less based on
partisan identity, then other constraints worked better-parties had their own
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internal debates and divides that operated as a form of self-constraint when
they were in power, and their ideological heterogeneity meant they tolerated
and cooperated more with parties out of power. But now, when parties are
more coherent and party voting is central, government in opposition rules
provide a check on power that accounts for the reality of contemporary partisan
politics.
Government in opposition rules would also create a more equitable
distribution of political power, ensuring that political minorities-whose
power has been decreasing under both Democratic and Republican-dominated
governments in Washington- still have a real voice. In other words,
government in opposition rules are not just necessary to constrain power, but
also to create the conditions for real democratic politics again. Finally,
government in opposition rules would create a more efficient administrative
state, ensuring that an administrative state increasingly dominated by partisan
politics would have a steady and constant corps of qualified bureaucratic
officials-and these bureaucratic officials would have less of an incentive to
cater to political officials.
A. Problems with the American Separation of Powers
1. Unified Government
Separation of powers in the United States works well-perhaps too well-
when winners' powers are divided among the two major parties, with each
party controlling at least some bundle of winners' powers. During those times,
winners' powers clash with winners' powers, and neither political party is able
to assert hegemonic control over government. But when one political party
captures all of the levers of power, then the American system of separation of
powers fails. This is because the result is unified government, or the American
equivalent of the illiberal democrat: a political leader (George W. Bush in the
past decade and now Barack Obama) who stands in control of all winners'
powers and so poses a real risk of overreach and excess.
The problem with the American Constitution's treatment of separation of
powers during periods of unified government has been explained most recently
by Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes.16 9 The creation of multiple bundles of
winners' powers, and the allocation of these winners' powers to different
branches of government, operated under the assumption that political figures
would vote and operate out of some degree of loyalty to the branch of
169. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 3.
119:548 2009
GOVERNMENT IN OPPOSITION
government in which they operate, rather than the political party that helped
get them to that branch of government. In other words, with winners' powers
divided among several branches of government, it would not matter who
controlled each branch of government if political figures voted and acted based
on their branch identity- if they acted based on what part of the government
they belonged to rather than the party that created them. The mere fact that a
political figure was a member of a branch of government meant that their
voting and loyalties would be determined by that membership. If you were a
Republican member of the House from Alabama, then the fact that you were a
Republican or from Alabama did not matter; what did matter is that you were
a member of the House, and you would be sure to exercise winners' powers to
maximize the prerogatives of the House of Representatives.
This vision of branch loyalty has collapsed, and so with it has the American
originalist vision of a separation of powers based on branch identity. We
transitioned from a world where politics involved "affairs of honor"'170 to a
world where politics were characterized by the fact that "party lines predict
political behavior better than branch ones."17' Party-line voting was only
around forty percent about forty years ago; now it is close to three-quarters of
the time.lz7 Not only do members of Congress and the President' 73 vote and act
according to the positions of their political party, but the two main political
parties now represent increasingly distinct, coherent, and opposed policy
platforms,' 74 and so not only do they strongly oppose and disagree with one
170. See JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC
(2001). Freeman argues that a key notion during the early years of the Republic-and the
core animating idea behind the original constitutional design-was that politics was about
"the establishment and defense of personal honor and reputation, and with offering
leadership based on . . . personal and social standing." Robert F. Bauer, Thoughts on the
Democratic Basis for Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 35 IND. L. REV. 747, 751 n.13
(2002).
171. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 3, at 2326.
172. JAMES Q. WILSON & JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 339 tbl.13.4 (loth ed.
2006); see also id. at 34o ("[Plarty affiliation is still the most important thing to know about
a member of Congress. Knowing whether a member is a Democrat or a Republican will not
tell you everything about the member, but it will tell you more than any other single fact.").
173. This partisan behavior is not just a feature of congressional action, but also of the actions of
the President. During President Bill Clinton's second term, when he faced a Republican
Congress, he opposed about two-thirds of the actions of the Congress. See RICHARD S.
CONLEY, THE PRESIDENCY, CONGRESS, AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT: A POSTWAR
ASSESSMENT: THE ESSENTIALS 29-31 (2003).
174. Elena Kagan has noted that the most conservative Democrat is now, according to most
studies, still more liberal than the most liberal Republican. Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2312 (2001).
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another, but their internal agreement and unity is also much greater. When not
one party controls all winners' powers- during periods of divided government,
in other words-then there is constraint on winning political coalitions. If
anything, we might be concerned during periods of divided government that
there are too many brakes on the political gas pedal, and that not enough is
done.
By contrast, during periods of unified government, political constraints do
not operate as well, if at all. The formal constitutional structure still creates
multiple bundles of winners' powers and allocates these to different winners,
but since these "different" winners are all members of the same political party,
winners' powers are combined rather than conflicted. During periods of
unified government, the President rarely threatens to veto legislation or
actually vetoes legislation, and there is overwhelming agreement on policy
issues between the President and Congress, now approaching near ninety-five
percent of the time. With the President and Congress of the same party, they
can work together to find federal judges in greater agreement with them,
federal judges who are thus less likely to prevent them from pursuing their
agenda and the agenda of their party; 17 the same is true of other cabinet
officials and political appointees of the federal government. In other words,
government does a lot during periods of unified government, because there are
no winners' powers to be used to constrain other winners' powers.
If members of the opposing political party were granted a certain basic core
of winners' powers during periods of unified government, then there would
always be a check on the operation of a unified government. With political
175. Nancy Scherer found, in her study, "that there is no difference in voting behavior between
judges appointed during united and divided government." Nancy Scherer, Who Drives the
Ideological Makeup of the Lower Federal Courts in a Divided Government?, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
191, 191 (2001). But her findings are based on an examination of three areas that, during the
time period she studied, were not major sources of legal cleavages between the Democratic
and Republican Parties. See id. at 191 (describing how her study focused on "search and
seizure cases, race discrimination cases, and federalism cases"). Scherer's findings have also
been questioned by other research. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL & HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, at xxv (2003)
("[There are] problems with Scherer's analysis [that] are noteworthy"); Tracey E. George,
Judicial Independence and the Ambiguity of Article III Protections, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 221, 239
(2003) ("[U]nified government is highly correlated with the ability of presidents to name
judges who match their policy views on a consistent basis in a set of cases. And this result is
intuitive. When the President's party controls the Senate, the Administration may meet
privately with Senate leaders to negotiate over nominees thereby ensuring the selection of
judges who most closely match the ruling party's perspectives as well as their rapid
confirmation. Moreover, unified government limits the role of opposing interest groups in
judicial selection by denying them access to key decisionmakers and curtailing the public
portion of the Article 1I process.").
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figures operating according to the best interests of their party, this would
ensure that, no matter what, a political figure with the opposite interests of the
party occupying all of the rest of the winners' powers would have some
winners' powers of their own. It would be as if there were always some divided
government, even in the midst of unified government. Of course, as mentioned
in the previous Part, the amount of government in opposition rules could be
varied-perhaps in periods where one party not just controls all winners'
powers, but controls them by wide margins, there could be even more
government in opposition rules-perhaps giving losing political coalitions
some cabinet positions, a few more deputy cabinet positions, and so on.
An example of how government in opposition rules might operate -and
might better constrain unified government -comes from the situation that led
to the torture memoranda produced by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in
the Department of Justice (DOJ) several years ago. In early 2002, the OLC
authored two memos on legal protections afforded to Al Qaeda and Taliban
captives. 176 On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum
agreeing with this conclusion, and stating that prisoners would be treated in a
manner "appropriate and consistent with military necessity. '1 77 Later that same
year, OLC issued another memorandum about whether interrogation tactics
that might seem extreme violated certain legal obligations. This memorandum
concluded that only pain reaching the level of "death, organ failure, or the
permanent impairment of significant body function ' 178 might pose legal
problems, and that even then it could be unconstitutional to apply certain laws
prohibiting torture to executive exercises of authority in the war on terror. 179 In
January of 2003, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was producing a
report on proper interrogation techniques, he relied substantially on these
176. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Office
of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes
II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TOABU
GHR I3 81 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter TORTURE
PAPERS]; Draft Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't.
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, and Robert J. Delabunty, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep't. of
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't. of Def. (Jan.
9, 2002), in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 38.
177. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), in
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 176, at 134, 135.
178. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't. of Justice,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 176, at 176.
179. Id. at 173.
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memoranda."' And the Rumsfeld report had major influences on American
policy towards prisoners, detainees, and the torture of detainees that resulted-
and in many ways led to - the appalling and offensive disaster and consequence
of the excess of winners' powers that was Abu Ghraib.
It is interesting to think how things might have been at least more
constrained, and potentially even forestalled, if there had been government in
opposition rules. In actuality, the OLC memos were produced by two OLC
lawyers, John Yoo and Jay Bybee, with clear Republican credentials and
affiliations. 8 The memoranda were reviewed by a range of officials, all
Republican-appointed or at least Republican-affiliated officials, '82 including by
then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales.' 8 3 While the Senate was
controlled by the Democrats for a portion of early 2002 when the torture
memos were first constructed, the Republicans controlled the Senate starting
in January 2003, the House of Representatives during this entire time, and
then of course the executive branch during this entire time, when the torture
memos were being reviewed and implemented. So, of course, there was no one
exercising winners' powers to do anything about the torture memoranda.
It might be that the Democratic Party, as the party in opposition, could
have or would have done nothing about these memoranda if they did possess
winners' powers (by having a Democratic Attorney General, a Democratic head
of the Office of Legal Counsel, and/or ensuring a sufficient number of
Democratic chairs of major congressional committees). Perhaps the Democratic
18o. WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS (2003), in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 176, at 286.
181. John Yoo clerked for two of the more conservative judges on the federal bench, first Judge
Laurence H. Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and then Justice
Clarence Thomas of the Supreme Court. He also served as the general counsel to the
Republican majority on the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee during the 199os. See Berkeley
Law: University of California: Faculty Profiles, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/
php-programs/faculty/facultyProfile.php?facID=235 (last visited June 26, 2009). Bybee was
appointed a federal judge by the Bush Administration. See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture,
and the Ticking Time Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425, 1452 (2005) ("The irony is that Jay S. Bybee,
who signed the Justice Department's highly permissive torture memo, is now a federal
judge.").
182. See Dana Priest, CIA Puts Harsh Tactics on Hold, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at Al (noting
that the latter Bybee Memorandum "was vetted by a larger number of officials, including
lawyers at the National Security Council, the White House counsel's office and Vice
President Cheney's office").
183. See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Bush's Counsel Sought Ruling About Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at Ai; R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen, Gonzales Helped Set the Course for
Detainees, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2005, at Ai.
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Party, reeling from its losses on the Iraq issue in the 2002 midterm elections,
would never have constrained the Bush Administration's policies on torture.
But when the Democrats regained control of Congress in the 2006 elections,
they did hold hearings about the torture memoranda and requested
information as a means of shining light on these problematic documents.' 84 It
is true that the Republicans did as well, but with so much more to gain by
pointing out the foibles of the Republican Bush Administration, this might
have happened even earlier if the Democrats controlled Congress. Democrats
might not have cared about torture, but they would have cared about political
gains, and a niche might have existed for them to expose the torture memos.
With only losers' powers as their disposal, they could not do that. But with
some winners' powers years later, they could-and if they had some winners'
powers years earlier even in the minority -then the torture memos might have
been revealed earlier, and their disastrous consequences avoided.
2. Majoritarian Domination
As mentioned earlier, one global trend in constitutional democracies is to
reduce the power of losing coalitions-to reduce the importance of and
protection for the losers' powers that these losing coalitions traditionally
exercise. Arend Lijphart has argued that this majoritarian domination is even
more pronounced in presidential democracies like the United States. 8 ' Several
structural changes in American politics validate his claim. In the past
generation, winning coalitions have become more powerful-and losing
coalitions less powerful. This has meant a gradual suppression of losing
political coalitions by whichever of the two major political parties constitutes
the winning political coalition. Government in opposition rules are necessary,
then, not just to ensure that winning coalitions do not exceed proper
democratic boundaries, but also to ensure that losing coalitions remain relevant
when they are in the minority.
Barbara Sinclair has documented the decrease in the power of minority
186 hath nparties in the United States Congress, via what the newest and most
184. See Scott Shane, Two Testify on Memo Spelling Out Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2008,
atA15.
iS5. See, e.g., LIJPHART, supra note 140, at 161 (noting the ways that the presidential system of the
United States tends to give winners of elections disproportionate lawmaking and other
powers).
186. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, LEADERS, AND LAWMAKING: THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POSTREFORM ERA (1995) [hereinafter SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS];
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comprehensive book about this trend has called the "procedural polarization"
of Congress. 7 Because of changes in the rules and norms of the House and the
Senate-although less so in the SenatelSS -individual members and
committees in the House and the Senate have much less power than they did
thirty or forty years ago. Party leaders exercise greater power to select
committee chairs, to decide which committee will consider legislation, and to
structure the procedure on the floor of the House or Senate by which the
collective body will debate and vote on legislation.' 89 The leaders of the
majority parties decide who attends summit meetings when the Congress
meets with the President to resolve disputes, and also raise money through
special leadership political action committees (PACs) which they use to
support the campaign efforts of individual members.19 ° With power
centralized like this in the hands of the leaders of the winning coalition -rather
than dispersed among committees and members-the winning coalition has
become more powerful and more in control of the operations of both houses of
Congress. And, with parties more coherent and ideological, this has meant
greater attempts-and ability-to suppress the actions of losing political
coalitions by the more polarizing and ideological leaders of the winning
coalition.
The results for the losers' powers possessed by losing political coalitions
have been disastrous. The number of legislative initiatives that were subject to
open rules that permitted all germane amendments declined from eighty-five
percent in the 1977-1978 session of the House to about thirty-four percent in
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS (1997) [hereinafter SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX].
187. See SEAN M. THERAIULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 218 (2OO8).
188. John Ferejohn, A Tale of Two Congresses: Social Policy in the Clinton Years, in THE SOCIAL
DIIDE: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FUTURE OF THE ACTrIVIST GOvERNMENT 49, 68
(Margaret Weir ed., 1998). ("Everyone agrees that Congress has gradually changed from a
loosely structured locus of committees and subcommittees operating fairly independently,
with parry leaders serving largely as "traffic cops," to a more coherent, collegial, partisan,
and sometimes even centralized institution, where significant policymaking activity
sometimes takes place in the offices of party leaders, in party caucuses, and on the chamber
floors. These changes have gone farther and happened faster in the House of
Representatives than in the Senate .. .but they have been visible in both chambers to
varying extents.").
189. See John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The Transition to Republican Rule in the House:
Implicationsfor Theories of Congressional Politics, 112 POL. SC. Q_-541 (1997).
19o. See Gerald M. Pomper, Parliamentary Government in the United States, in THE STATE OF THE
PARTIES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PARTIES 251 (John C. Green &
Daniel M. Shea eds., 1999).
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the 1991-1992 session of the House.019 Committee chairs are increasingly loyal
and responsive to the majority party in Congress rather than to a range of
political coalitions."9' Committee members from the losing political coalition
are given less time to speak. 93
This is the state of affairs for losing political coalitions in Congress, but
things are not much better when we consider the changing nature of
presidential power. The President is, after all, the only national majoritarian
official, the only political figure exercising winners' powers because of an
election by a national majority, a national winning coalition. And so the rise in
presidential power compared to congressional power-the rise in the only
branch of government constituted almost entirely of members only from the
winning political coalition-is consequential (there are no losing political
coalitions exercising losers' powers in the executive branch). During
presidencies of both parties, the power of the executive branch has increased.
The President now submits his own budget request to Congress.194 Presidents
since FDR have issued a staggeringly greater number of executive orders than
presidents before them and have centralized control over the regulatory state. 9
The greater number of foreign military commitments-commitments
supervised by the executive branch- have increased the power of the President
because of his unilateral control over the main issue of the day. 9 6 The most
majoritarian person in the American government is now all the more powerful.
What can be done to ensure that losing political coalitions remain relevant?
The Democratic or the Republican Party in the United States almost never
controls more than a bare majority of the seats in the House or Senate, and
even presidential elections are essentially always decided by a few percentage
points. Losing political coalitions in the United States have a great share of the
vote, and so the fact that they have an increasingly small part of the power is
problematic. This majoritarian domination problem is less severe in the United
States during periods of divided government. In those situations, the losing
political coalition still has access to some winners' powers since they control
some parts of the federal government.
i91. See SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, supra note 186, at 140.
192. See SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX, supra note 186, at 1O5.
193. Id. at 6.
194. A compelling recent book on the rise of presidential power highlights this and other
growing manifestations of increased executive power, regardless of which party occupies the
White House. See MATTHEW CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, PRESIDENTIAL POWER:
UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED 19-24 (2007).
195. See id. at 24-27.
196. Id. at 24-25.
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But what about during periods of unified government? Assigning these
losing political coalitions more losers' powers would not resolve this
majoritarian domination of American democracy. It would result in the same
suppression or degradation of losers' powers that has already transpired in
regards to existing losers' powers. Granting losing political coalitions winners'
powers during periods of unified government, then, ensures that these
coalitions and the citizens they represent have their voice heard at least
somewhat in proportion to their electoral relevance.
3. Bureaucratic Competence
One of the goals of a successful system of separation of powers, in addition
to constraint and how that promotes rights and democratic self-government, is
governmental competence. And the current American separation of powers
system hinders excellence in technical administration. The American
administrative state has always been-and has become even more-political
than many of its counterparts. 97 American bureaucrats understand their role as
much more political and much less technical than their counterparts in
nonpresidential systems.' 98 A substantial number of high-level American
bureaucratic positions are occupied by political appointees. 99
The consequences of such a political bureaucratic regime are serious.
Because bureaucratic positions are so political, and the support enjoyed by
certain officials will vary based on the political climate, tenure in these
positions is relatively short. The median time served for political appointees is
about two years.2"' Once they complete their service as high-ranking political
appointees, these bureaucratic officials then often leave government service
197. Cf. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 702 ("There are, then, some pretty fundamental reasons for
associating an American-style separation of powers with unattractive forms of bureaucratic
governance. Worse yet, these theoretical connections are abundantly confirmed in
practice.").
198. See JOELD D. ABERACH, ROBERT D. PUTNAM & BERT A. ROCKMAN, BUREAUCRATS &
POLITICIANS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 94-95 (1981); Renate Mayntz & Hans-Ulrich
Derlien, Party Patronage and Politicization of the West German Administrative Elite 197o-1987-
Toward Hybridization?, 2 GOVERNANCE 384, 394 (1989) ("[C]ivil servants today distinguish
their role from that of politicians even more than they did in 1970. ... ) (emphasis
omitted).
199. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF
ACCOUNTABILITY 7-13 (1995).
200. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FACT SHEET, POLITICAL APPOINTEES: TURNOVER RATES IN




altogether, with less than ten percent of political appointees by one count
remaining in the public sector after their initial appointment.2"' Not only do
these officials not spend time learning their particular job, they do not spend
time learning how government in general operates.
With such dramatic and constant turnover, bureaucratic officials cannot
form working relationships with their colleagues, and do not learn the
idiosyncrasies of their policy portfolios, or the individuals working on the same
or related portfolios. This short-term horizon is worsened even more during
presidential transitions, when, because so many positions are politically
appointed, there will be so many new officials in control. As the Volcker
Commission on Public Service put it, "excessive numbers of political
appointees serving relatively brief periods may undermine the President's
ability to govern, insulating the Administration from needed dispassionate
advice and institutional memory. " "'
But no one believes that bureaucrats, even in a perfectly designed system,
either can or should be purely technical creatures implementing objectively
neutral commands with the best available evidence. The days of James
Landis °3 are over, and the pretense of rationality and rationality alone
justifying bureaucratic actions is gone. In other words, even if we could create a
separation of powers that promoted pure rationality and was apolitical, no one
believes in pure politically neutral rationality anymore-and so we need
political accountability. Creating a European-style civil service for the entire
federal bureaucracy' °4 is not a choice for a country that recognizes the need for
political accountability over bureaucrats.05
2ol. See Linda L. Fisher, Fifty Years of Presidential Appointments, in THE IN-AND-OUTERS:
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES AND TRANSIENT GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON 1, 27 (G. Calvin
Mackenzie ed., 1987).
202. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., LEADERSHIP FOR AMERICA: REBUILDING THE PUBLIC
SERVICE 7 (1989).
203. See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS io-i6, 46-50 (1938).
204. See Neil Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2328 (2006) (discussing the "European model ... that... attracts
excellent college graduates and retains them").
205. For arguments about the importance of accountability in the administrative state see, for
instance, Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, lO5 HARv. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1231 (1994); and Geoffrey P.
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 41.
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An increase in government in opposition rules would likely raise skepticism
among those attached to the idea of an American "unitary executive ''z °6 and the
belief that having all of those exercising executive winners' powers be
accountable to the President means that there is greater political
accountability-after all, a clear, singular person can be blamed for any failures
in the executive branch-and regulatory coherence and dispatch (again, since
one figure has ultimate control over executive winners' powers). It might be
the case that, as an informal matter, providing members of losing political
coalitions with executive winners' powers could reduce some of these benefits
of the unitary executive, in favor of some of the benefits of a more constrained
and politically divided executive. But many of the benefits of a unitary
executive remain.
After all, while there is little discussion about constitutional constraints on
requiring the appointment of members of losing political coalitions to cabinet
positions, as discussed below, we know that there would be major
constitutional problems with limiting the President's power to remove these
cabinet officials from opposing parties,20 7 and so these government in
opposition rules would still not undermine the President's authority to
terminate cabinet members (from his party or from another party). And "there
is consensus that the power to remove subordinates who do not follow the
President's directives, or in whom he no longer has confidence, is vital to his
supervisory ability and authorized by the Constitution."2°' Because the
President could remove members of losing political coalitions, it means that if
they are interfering too much with the President's regulatory agenda, he can
remove them- and if he does not, we know that we can blame the President
and vote the President out of office. Also, because these government in
opposition rules are structured whereby members of clearly identifiable
political parties are appointed, and appointed because of their membership in
those parties, we know who beyond the President to blame for policy failures.
For instance, if President Obama were required to appoint Republican Senator
Orrin Hatch as Attorney General, and the Justice Department made some
206. For an underappreciated article in this discussion about the unitary executive which makes
these arguments most clearly, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. Rv. 23 (1995).
207. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 178o (2006)
("Conventional wisdom supposes that the President enjoys a power to remove all
presidentially appointed officers, save for judges. A corollary of this belief is that neither
Congress nor the judiciary may remove such officers, for when the Constitution grants the
President a power, it often follows that no one else can enjoy that power.").
208. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52ADMIN. L. RPv. 1111, 1156 (2000).
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embarrassing errors, we might blame Obama-after all, Obama would not
have fired Attorney General Hatch, although he could have -but we also and
perhaps even more so could blame the Republican Party, because it would be
Hatch's status as a member and leader of that party that would have led to
Hatch's appointment in the first place.
Even beyond that, the manner in which members of losing political
coalitions are appointed can also assist with presidential control and with
regulatory coherence. In many systems with government in opposition rules -
and so potentially for the United States-the head of the winning political
coalition must appoint a member of the losing political coalition, but gets to
choose which member of the losing political coalition to appoint. That was the
case, for instance, with Nelson Mandela's appointment of F.W. de Klerk under
the 1994 interim constitution; Mandela had to appoint a member of de Klerk's
party, and decided de Klerk was the most tolerable. This means that a
President Obama would not have to appoint a Sarah Palin or a Ron Paul to his
cabinet; he could instead appoint a more moderate and ideologically similar
Republican like Richard Lugar, who is more likely to pursue the same policy
goals that the President desires.
B. Design Fundamentals
Even if government in opposition rules would be a welcome addition to the
American constitutional system, the incredible variety of such rules discussed
in Part II make it clear that there are still some major issues of institutional
design that need to be resolved first. As Part II mentioned, government in
opposition rules vary really along three axes: (1) How mandatory are these
rules; (2) How often are these rules reviewed and what is the exact amount of
these rules present; and (3) May members of winning and losing coalitions
exercise powers afforded by these rules. This Part already has mentioned how
it would be wise to have these rules triggered only when Congress and the
Presidency are controlled by the same party. This Section elaborates slightly
more on the specifics of an American government in opposition regime by
arguing that these rules, when in place, should be mandatory, negotiated, and
available only to losing coalitions. A central theme of the argument for these
specific parts of an American government in opposition regime has to deal with
one of the constitutional evils that this regime is designed to fight, which was
identified earlier: the absence of constraint in unified government. By
removing many of these rules from the vagaries of politics- from the vagaries
that a unified government could take advantage of- these rules would
guarantee losing political coalitions a degree of power and capacity to constrain
winning political coalitions.
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The first major design question is how coercive to make government in
opposition rules. As we have seen, there are really three potential different
answers to this question: (i) mandatory government in opposition rules, of the
genre in South Africa, where if the losing political party achieves a certain
degree of success then they are guaranteed winners' powers -and of course the
guarantee can arise from constitutional provision, statutory requirement, or an
informal norm rising to the level of coerciveness of a legal norm; (2)
encouraged government in opposition rules, of the genre related to the judicial
appointments process in Germany, where the rules create certain strong
incentives that could lead to losing political parties exercising winners' powers;
and (3) permitted government in opposition rules, where no rules or norms
prevent losing political parties from exercising winners' powers, but nor are
there any requirements or incentives either.
Because many countries have experimented with rules from each of these
three categories, we have much information about the consequences of these
different genres of government in opposition rules. And the evidence suggests
that, since government in opposition rules are meant to counteract the problem
of the illiberal democrat that can arise from unified government, the more
coercive the rules the more they are likely to have their intended effect. The
more government in opposition rules can be manipulated by the normal
political process, the less they will constrain the illiberal democrat that the
President of the United States can become during periods of unified
government. Where there is no sense of obligation to make government in
opposition rules practically meaningful, then leaders of winning coalitions will
only honor these rules when it is in their political interests to do so-which
defeats the entire purpose of having these rules in the first place. This means
that if these rules follow from informal understandings, they are easier to be
ignored by a particularly powerful winning political coalition; while they still
might be ignored by that same coalition if they are more coercive, there at least
will be more of a political and potentially even legal cost for doing so.
Consider the experience with government in opposition rules in stable
democratic countries similar to the United States. In Great Britain, some of the
government in opposition rules result from statutory obligations, such as Short
Money provided to opposition parties.2 °9 These rules have remained relatively
20g. See, e.g., Ministerial and Other Salaries Order, 1994, S.I. 1994/32o6 (increasing salaries);
Ministerial and Other Salaries Order, 1991, S.I. 1991/2886 (increasing salaries); Ministerial
and Other Salaries Order, 1987, S.I. 1987/1836 (increasing salaries). The foundational
statute is really the Ministerial and Other Salaries Act, 1975, C. 27 (Eng.). The Act
superseded the structure established by the Opposition by the Ministers of the Crown Act
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stable and permanent, and if anything have only been expanded in the
direction of granting more power to losing political coalitions. By contrast,
Prime Minister's Questions, which are merely the product of an informal
understanding, were altered when a very popular political figure, Tony Blair,
became Prime Minister. In 1961, Parliament established a twice-weekly event
called "Prime Minister's Questions," with each session lasting forty-five
minutes-but this was established simply as a matter of parliamentary norm,
not because of any statutory or other formal change.210 Once Blair came into
office, he limited Prime Minister's Questions to once a week, and limited the
number of questions that his Cabinet would respond to as part of the
customary (and not compelled) Question Days procedure, 1' the elite "FOIA" I
referenced earlier in this Article. Blair was criticized for changing the Prime
Minister's Questions and Question Days procedures, but because he was not
repealing a statutory or constitutional command, the criticisms he faced were
minimal and largely inconsequential.
Without any compulsion to ensure that losing political coalitions exercise
winners' powers, members of winning political coalitions will give power to
losing political coalitions only when winning political coalitions are weak and
in need of a political boost-in other words, at the very moment when winning
political coalitions are so weak that winning political coalitions do not need to
be constrained in the first place. Prime Minister Gordon Brown expressed an
interest in having a "government of all the talents,2. 12 but that was when his
Labour Party was essentially tied with the opposition Conservatives despite
having triumphed overwhelmingly in the past few elections. 3 Likewise,
President Bill Clinton, under no obligation to appoint Republicans to his
cabinet, appointed Republican Senator William Cohen to be his Secretary of
1937. See SIR THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS, AND USAGES OF
PARLIAMENT 252 n.19 (2oth ed. Butterworths 1983).
210. See Sudha Setty, The President's Question Time: Power, Information, and the Executive
Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 247, 264 (2008).
211. See HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, FACTSHEET PI PROCEDURE SERIES: PARLIAMENTARY
QUESTIONS (JUNE 2009), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/
Poi.pdf.
212. See Colin Brown & Nigel Morris, Brown Completes Government of "All Talents" with Team of
Outsiders, INDEP. (U.K.), June 30, 2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
politics/brown-completes-government-of-aI-talents-with-team-f-utsiders-45534l.html.
213. See Poll Watch: June 2007, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics/6264488.stm
(last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
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Defense only when he had the political need to shore up his defense
credentials.1 4
It is true, of course, that any rule, no matter how legally or informally
binding, can still be repealed by a broad and bold enough winning political
coalition. But, as mentioned earlier, there are all sorts of reasons related to time
and resource constraints that would prevent a winning political coalition from
repealing or ignoring a mandatory government in opposition rule. In
particular, in a stable democratic system like the United States, foundational
parts of public law-what William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have called
"super-statutes, ' '215 such as the Civil Rights Act of 19642,6-remain in effect
many years after their enactment and after enduring unified government of
both parties. Even some of the American government in opposition rules, such
as the Seven Member Rule or the blue slip process, go back a long time and
have survived government by Democrats and Republicans. 17
The second major design question to resolve about an American
government in opposition regime is how to go about determining the precise
amount of government in opposition rules; is the amount to be fixed or
negotiated, and is it to be proportionate or ascertained through some other
mechanism? Again, there is a range of experience to draw from, from the
negotiated rules that exist for much of the British government in opposition
regime to the constitutionally fixed and proportionate system of the Interim
South African Constitution.
However important it is for government in opposition rules to be
mandatory -so they are not repealed or substantially undermined by a unified
government-it is also the case that making these rules too mandatory and
removed from the normal democratic updating process makes these rules as
susceptible to countermajoritarian attacks as the courts. Removing these rules
too much from the democratic process makes them reflective of an outdated
reality, and also makes them seem less legitimate. In Lebanon, for instance, the
214. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHi. L. REv. 865, 9Ol
(2007).
215. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 5o DuKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001).
If the government in opposition rules were to be made binding as part of statutory law, they
would probably be considered super-statutes.
2W6. Id. at 1237-42 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a super-statute).
217. The Seven Member Rule goes back to 1966. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 2954 (20o6). The blue slip
process goes as far back as 1954. See Memorandum from Senate Judiciary Comm. Staff to
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chair, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 22, 1979), reprinted in
Selection and Confirmation of FederalJudges: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 6th
Cong. 118, 119 (1979) ("The blue slip has been used for over 25 years, according to former
committee staff members . . ").
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government in opposition rules created by the National Pact of 1943 were
initially very popular and broadly effective. With time, though, Muslim leaders
began to criticize these rules as unrepresentative of the new demographics of
the country. 28 Likewise, demographics had shifted, so that the initial six to five
Christian to Muslim ratio for parliamentary elections was outdated and the size
of the Muslim population had probably surpassed the size of the Christian
population.1 9 So, to ensure that government in opposition rules remain
legitimate and current, they should be negotiated with some frequency.
Finally, one other design question related to government in opposition
rules is whether to make them available to losing as well as winning political
coalitions; using the terminology of this Article, then, the question is whether
these rules should be generally applicable. The experience with generally
applicable government in opposition rules is similar to the experience with
government in opposition rules that are optional or encouraged; powerful
winning coalitions are able to minimize the degree to which losing political
coalitions actually benefit from these rules. When government in opposition
rules are made broadly available to winning and to losing political coalitions,
winning political coalitions-with their greater resources and political appeal-
are able to prevent losing political coalitions from benefiting from these rules.
Again, the experience with the Blair Government once it first came into
power is instructive. Not only did the Blair Government reduce the time
permitted for Prime Minister's Questions and the amount of questions that it
would answer as part of its Question Days procedure, but it also dominated the
Question Days procedure. With more members of Parliament, and therefore
more assistants working for those members of Parliament, Blair's Labour Party
had a greater capacity to use the Question Days procedure, even though it was
formally available to the Labour Party and all other parties in Parliament."2
If losing coalitions and only losing political coalitions can use government
in opposition rules, though, there are some other concerns. As a political
matter, these rules-protecting only the interests of political minorities-might
be seen as "quotas" in the way that certain political forces derailed the
nomination of Lani Guinier to be Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
for supporting proportionate representation.2  Likewise, if winning political
218. See Richard Hrair Dekmejian, Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon, 1o
COMP. POL. 251, 254 (1978).
219. See Brenda M. Seaver, The Regional Sources of Pover-Sharing Failure: The Case of Lebanon, 115
POL. SCI. Q247, 255-59 (2000).
220. See DURKIN & GAY, supra note 159, at 1.
221. One day after Guinier was nominated, the conservative press labeled her a "quota queen."
See Clint Bolick, Clinton's Quota Queens, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at A12. This is what she
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coalitions are entirely excluded from exercising certain powers or holding
certain positions, it might bring us back to Adrian Vermeule's concern that
submajority rules like government in opposition rules could be chronically
unstable because they can always be reserved by the winning political
coalition.222 This is the flip side of Heather Gerken's arguments about how
"dissenting by deciding" creates more responsible winners by sensitizing
winners to the needs and concerns of losers. 3 If political losers exercise
unilateral winners' powers-even if those exercises of winners' powers can be
overturned by winning coalitions - then they might be less inclined to consider
the interests of winning political coalitions, and so might not negotiate a
compromise solution with winning coalitions that will prevent their actions
from being constantly overturned.
C. The Constitutional Considerations
As the previous several Sections discussed, the experience with government
in opposition rules around the world, and the nature of the current American
political scene -suggest that an American government in opposition regime
should apply when there is divided government, and should require that, after
negotiation, there be a certain minimum number of high-ranking government
officials from the opposing political party. But could Congress do this by
statute, the kind of framework statute that other recent pieces of legal
scholarship have proposed as reforms to the American separation of powers
regimes?2" This is an interesting constitutional question, and one deserving of
its own article. For now, I will offer some general thoughts about some of the
constitutional considerations involved in such a framework statute.
Congress could almost certainly pass a statute requiring that, after
negotiations after each congressional election, the losing political coalition be
awarded a certain number of committee chair positions and be given other
powers in Congress. Congress has passed other major pieces of legislation that
was called going forward, even though she actually opposed quotas. See LANI GUINIER, THE
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 19,
189 (1994).
222. See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 88 ("[S]ubmajoritarian decisions are exposed to reversal by
subsequent majorities, and might thus be chronically unstable.").
223. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 2.
224. Bruce Ackerman has proposed that Congress could exercise broad executive emergency
powers by increasing supermajorities through a framework statute. See Ackerman, supra
note 3, at 1077 ("Throughout the twentieth century, Congress has enacted 'framework
statutes' that have sought to impose constitutional order on new and unruly realities that
were unforeseen by the Founders. The same technique will serve us well here.").
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regulate internal congressional procedures, such as the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 about congressional committee jurisdiction and
chair powers.22 s The weightier constitutional questions arise when we discuss
whether Congress could pass a statute commanding the President to appoint
members of losing political coalitions to executive and judicial positions.
Since government in opposition rules are meant to give members of losing
political coalitions substantial winners' powers, we are talking more about
what the Constitution says about the appointment of "principal officers. "226 To
the extent that Congress can control whom the President may appoint as
principal officers, much depends on the amount of executive power to be
exercised by these principal officers . 7 The framework government in
opposition statute discussed in this Article would require the President to
appoint as cabinet officials certain members of the opposing political party, so
presumably he would be appointing these officials to positions in which they
would exercise executive power.
There are no cases directly addressing the constitutionality of the forms of
statutory limitations on the President's appointment of principal officers
imagined by a government in opposition framework statute. There is a long
historical practice of Congress placing some statutory limitations on the
President's power to appoint, and Myers v. United States"' seems to indicate
these limitations are constitutionally acceptable since "[b]oth the majority and
dissent in Myers v. United States agreed that statutory qualifications for
officeholders were generally constitutional. " 9 Going as far back as the
225. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946); see George B. Galloway, The Operation of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41, 59-62 (1951) (discussing the importance
of this statute for congressional organization).
26. For the constitutional text supporting the distinction between "inferior" and "principal"
officers, see U.S. CONST. art. II, S 2.
227. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986) ("To permit an officer controlled by
Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress
could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the laws in any fashion
found to be unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional control over the
execution of the laws.. . is constitutionally impermissible.").
228. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
229. Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal
Officers, 1o U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 772 (20o8); see Myers, 272 U.S. at 128-29 (deciding that
limitations on the President's Appointments Power are constitutional); id. at 265 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) ("Every President has consistently observed [statutory qualifications for
officeholders]. This is true of those offices to which he makes appointments without the
advice and consent of the Senate as well as of those for which its consent is required."); see
also Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 74o (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[I]t is entirely proper for Congress
to specify the qualifications for an office that it has created ... ").
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Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has placed limitations on whom the President
could appoint even to cabinet positions such as Attorney General.23° Congress
has also placed many statutory limitations on who could hold other positions
that, while perhaps still executive in nature, are certainly less executive in
nature than the power exercised by an official like the Attorney General.23'
There are those who are critical of this practice, 32 but this practice is certainly
long and substantial.
Congressionally imposed constraints on the President's power of
appointment become more constitutionally problematic, though, when they
remove entirely the President's power to choose whom he or she desires to
become a "principal officer." In the statutory regimes discussed above, the
President still ultimately decides whom to appoint, and Congress only limits
what types of people qualify for positions-but still ultimately leaves it to the
President to choose among many thousands or even millions of options of
whom to appoint to a principal officer position. Even when the President faces
limitations on the power to appoint based on partisan identity-such as in the
case of the Federal Communications Commission and other independent
agencies, where "agency statutes require political balance, i.e., no more than a
bare majority of members of multi-member agencies may come from the same
political party, but there are exceptions"233 -the President still ultimately
decides whom precisely to appoint.
230. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789) (requiring that the Attorney
General be "learned in the law"); see, e.g., Myers, 272 U.S. at 265-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(collecting a large number of statutes prescribing qualifications for officeholders between
1789 and 1926).
231. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (20o6) (giving political party requirements for members of
FEC); 6 U.S.C. § 313(c)(2) (listing professional experience requirements for the
Administrator of FEMA); 29 U.S.C. § 12 (requiring that the Director of the Women's
Bureau at the Department of Labor must be a woman); 31 U.S.C. § 703(a) (establishing
appointment of the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller General by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from a list of three or more individuals
prepared by a nominating commission); An Act To Provide a Government for the Territory
of Hawaii, ch. 339, § 66, 31 Stat. 141, 153 (1900) (noting citizenship and age requirements for
the territorial governor of Hawaii); An Act To Remodel the Diplomatic and Consular
Systems of the United States, ch. 133, § 9, 1O Stat. 619, 623 (1855) (establishing a citizenship
requirement for diplomatic officials, some of whom have confirmation appointments).
232. See, e.g., 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 248, 25o (1989) (arguing that statutory qualifications for
principle officers are unconstitutional, but not stating an opinion about statutory
qualifications for inferior officers); Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive
Understanding of the Federal Appointments Process, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 467, 534-35
(1998).
233. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1111, 1139 (2000).
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GOVERNMENT IN OPPOSITION
The framework statute suggested by this Part, though, envisions the
opposition party in the United States unilaterally identifying whom to appoint
to a principal officer position, similar to the predominant government in
opposition model in use around the world. The American statute is structured
this way precisely to constrain presidential authority during times of unified
government; to ensure that the President cannot pick a moderate member of
the opposing party, who could very easily become another presidential
supplicant. In the government in opposition regime suggested for the United
States in this Article, for instance, President-elect Obama would not have the
chance to appoint any Republican to be his Secretary of Defense, thereby
giving him the chance to appoint a more bipartisan or left-leaning Republican
(perhaps someone such as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates). Instead, the
Republican Party would themselves nominate precisely whom they want to
serve as Obama's Secretary of Defense (perhaps obliging Obama to accept
someone such as John McCain).
This element of the framework statute is what might make the statute
unconstitutional under constitutional doctrine, particularly after Buckley v.
Valeo ,34 and therefore permissible only after a constitutional amendment.
Alternatively, the framework statute could be modified still to constrain the
President, but giving the President more power than simply forcing him or her
to accept whomever the opposition party deems desirable for an appointment.
For instance, the opposition party might provide the President with a list of
names, and the President would have complete discretion to choose from that
list of names. In this way, the threat of an omnipotent President during times
of unified government is somewhat constrained (since the President cannot
appoint anyone), but the President still holds the ultimate power to appoint
(since the President chooses whom to appoint from the list provided by the
opposite party).
Regardless of the constitutional issues, could a framework statute -or, for
that matter, a constitutional amendment creating government in opposition
rules-ever really happen? Both John McCain23  and Barack Obama
36
234. 424 U.S. 1, 127 (1976) (noting that the constitutional problems with the statute for the
Federal Election Commission include that "with respect to four of the six voting members of
the [Federal Election] Commission, neither the President, the head of any department, nor
the Judiciary has any voice in their selection").
235. See, e.g., McCain: I Will Appoint Democrats to My Cabinet, Fox NEWS, Sept. 7, 2008, available
at http://right-mind.us/blogs/blog-o/archive/2oo8/o9/o9/62962.aspx ("Republican John
McCain said Sunday if he's elected president, he will appoint Democrats to his Cabinet.").
236. See, e.g., Sarah Baxter, Brainstorming Obama Plans To Pick Republicans For Cabinet, TIMES OF
LONDON, Mar. 2, 2008, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
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mentioned during their campaigns their desire to appoint members of the
opposing party to their cabinet. More broadly, the political scene in the United
States features the same elements that led to the creation of government in
opposition rules in other countries: a close division of popularity between a
finite number of political parties and an increasing polarization and intensity of
preferences divided among this finite number of parties. In these situations,
political parties and their leaders in other countries have jointly agreed to create
government in opposition rules, to protect their parties and their interests in
case they do end up in the minority after certain elections. 37
CONCLUSION
At a time when British politics has been dominated by exceptionally large
figures-titans with names like Blair and Thatcher-Edward Short is a
relatively simple figure. He does not come from great wealth, and he has served
rather inconsequentially in a few leadership positions in British politics. Short
might best be known as the oldest current living member of the Parliament of
Great Britain at ninety-six years old. But Short's revolution in separation of
powers will outlast him and all of us. Short might not have the brilliance of a
Madison or a Montesquieu, but his innovations in separation of powers have
been almost as consequential. Short triggered much of the current government
in opposition system in Britain, which in turn has inspired the similar regimes
around the world that have been the subject of this Article. And these changes
have been as revolutionary and consequential as any other constitutional
modifications of the past several decades.
The system that Short helped create, which this Article calls government in
opposition, has changed the relationship between majorities and minorities,
and between electoral winners and electoral losers. Elections are not zero-sum
games, with the winners controlling all of the levers of power. Now, those who
lose an election will maintain some control, some capacity to influence power.
This otherwise simple idea has become complicated, because it has manifested
us-and americas/us elections/article3466823.ece ("Obama is hoping to appoint cross-party
figures to his cabinet such as Chuck Hagel, the Republican senator for Nebraska and an
opponent of the Iraq war, and Richard Lugar, leader of the Republicans on the Senate
foreign relations committee.").
237. See Shannon Roesler, Permutations of Judicial Power: The New Constitutionalism and the
Expansion of Judicial Authority, 32 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 545, 555 (2007) (discussing new
scholarship that argues that the "configuration that makes future electoral victory uncertain




itself in many forms in many countries around the world, and in constitutional
systems of all varieties and ages.
An idea like this spreads because it works, and because it has much to offer
the constitutions of the countries that have adopted it. Fragile democracies
concerned about coups and revolutions can ensure that perpetual and
permanent constraints on majorities will prevent that from happening. Stable
democracies concerned about the more stable yet still potent hubris of electoral
majorities can temper that hubris with the power granted to electoral
minorities in government in opposition systems. All voices are represented in
government, not just in dissent but in governing. And bureaucracies can use
their expertise to pursue good policy, without letting good politics interfere.
These are generalities for all constitutions, but the specifics are just as
compelling. Constitutions around the world might benefit from Short's
insights, but the United States in particular can learn from Short as well. The
past eight years placed debates about separation of powers at the heart of the
meaning of our Constitution, as central to the American constitutional debate
as questions about abortion and affirmative action. Discussions in the Supreme
Court about the War on Terror, in cases like Hamdi and Hamdan, have been
mostly about the optimal division of power between our branches of
government. And, at the end of the day, while our centuries of experience have
much to offer us, Short's ideas about the separation of powers, and their
manifestations around the globe, can show the way for an American and a
global separation of powers for the future.
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